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The United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Prac-
tices (UNCRBP) concluded on April 22, 1980 with the consentient
adoption of a resolution approving a "Set of Multilaterally Agreed
Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Busi-
ness Practices" (Agreed Principles and Rules).' The endorsed docu-
ment contains business practice2 guidelines for businesses engaged in
activities that affect international trade and urges nation-states to
1. United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices, The Set of Multi-
laterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/Conf./10 (1980). The UNCRBP must be distinguished
from the Commission on Transnational Corporations, an advisory body to the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations, which is also drafting a code of conduct for
transnational corporations. See, e.g., Centre on Transnational Corporations: Issues
Involved in the Formulation of a Code of Conduct, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/17 (1976). At the
time this Article was written, a United Nations official had announced that the commis-
sion was close to agreement on the code of conduct. 331 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) (U.S.
Export Weekly) C-3 (Nov. 4, 1980) (Sauvant, before the Southeastern Dialogue on the
Changing World Economy in Atlanta on October 24, 1980). The official noted that the
proposed code recommends that transnational corporations maximize their contributions
to the economic and social development of host countries and minimize their negative
effects on such development. Id
2. The term "restrictive business practices" corresponds generally to the American
term "antitrust," which has a peculiar historical derivation. The Sherman Act, the pri-
mary American antitrust statute, was a reaction to industrial trust agreements that were
formed in the 1880s. See generally W. LETVIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN
AMERICA (1965); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955).
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implement the guidelines. 3 The UNCRBP forwarded the agreement
to the United Nations General Assembly and recommended that the
General Assembly adopt the agreement by resolution at its thirty-
fifth session.4 Since every major international political bloc sent rep-
resentatives to the UNCRBP and the representatives unanimously
approved the Agreed Principles and Rules, the document should
gain the endorsement of the General Assembly without modifica-
tion.5
The UNCRBP deserves particular attention because it is the
first global negotiation to produce a compact on the control of
restrictive business practices since formal international discussions
on the issue began over fifty years ago.6 Moreover, the UNCRBP
participants compounded their surprise by producing a lengthy and
intricate text despite their strikingly diverse political philosophies.
This Article investigates the nature, scope, and possible ramifications
of this international compact. The Article begins with a brief
description of the format and legal nature of the document, and then
discusses the pressures that generated it and the directions to enter-
3. United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices, The Set of Multi-
laterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/Conf./10, Annex (1980), reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 813 (1980) [hereinafter cited without cross reference as Agreed Principles
and Rules]. Because of its adoption as a General Assembly resolution, see addendum
infra, the official text of the Agreed Principles and Rules is now contained in U.N. Doc.
A/C.2/35/6, Annex (1980).
4. See U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/Conf./10, supra note 1, at 2.
5. Davidow, The Seeking of a World Competition Code: Quixotic Quest? at 19
(1980) (unpublished paper on file at Cornell International Law Journal). Mr. Davidow is
Director of the Office of Policy Planning of the United States Department of Justice and
was a U.S. representative to UNCRBP. See [1980] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) A-7 to A-8; U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/Conf./I I, paras. (x)-(xv); U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/
Conf./Inf. I and 2 (1980). After this article was written, the General Assembly adopted
the Principles and Rules on December 5, 1980, at its 83d plenary meeting. See
addendum infra.
6. The history of international negotiations on restrictive business practices is con-
tained in Joelson, The Proposed International Code of Conduct as Related to Restrictive
Business Practices, 8 L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 837 (1976); Furnish, .4 Transnational
Approach to Restrictive Business Practices, 4 INT'L LAW. 317 (1970); Joelson & Griffin,
International Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices Engaged in by Transnational
Enterprises: 4 Prognosis, 11 INT'L LAW. 5, 5-15 (1977); Kintner, Joelson & Vaghi, Grop-
ingfor a Truly International Antitrust Law, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 75, 85-96 (1973); Davidow,
supra note 5, at 1-6.
The first formal international discussion on restrictive business practices took place in
1927 when, under the auspices of the League of Nations, the Industrial Committee on the
International Economic Conference considered a proposal directed at harmonizing
national laws on restrictive business practices. See Oualid, The Social Effects of Interna-
tional Industrial Agreements, League of Nations Doc. C.E.C.P. 94, at 35 (1926). The
proposal was rejected on grounds that have plagued subsequent attempts to reach inter-
national agreements on the subject: divergent national attitudes on the issue precluded a
consensus on common norms, and an internationally imposed code was believed repug-
nant to national sovereignty. Furnish, supra, at 319-20.
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prises and states that it contains. The Article concludes with
thoughts on the value of the agreement.
I
AGREED PRINCIPLES AND RULES: FORMAT
AND LEGAL NATURE
A. FORMAT OF AGREED PRINCIPLES AND RULES
The Agreed Principles and Rules is an unusually wordy restric-
tive business practices code. The document contains a preamble and
seven major sections. Within the sections are forty-seven provisions,
several of which have numerous subparts. The document is unlike
most national and international restrictive business practices codes
which are characteristically brief and general.7 As noted below,
however, the extra language in the Agreed Principles and Rules does
not often provide clarity. Rather, the length of the document is a
result of delicate political compromises among the widely diverse
views of the conference participants.
The preamble and section A set forth the drafters' objectives
and intentions. Section B contains definitions of key terms-
"restrictive business practices" and "enterprises," for example-and
specifies the scope of the document's application. Section C includes
a potpourri of general principles that either flavor or limit the docu-
ment's operative standards. Section D, the most important section of
the document, sets out standards for the behavior of commercial
enterprises. The core of the section is subsection D(3), which con-
demns certain business "agreements or arrangements," and subsec-
tion D(4), which condemns certain acts of "abuse of a dominant
position of market power." The document thus incorporates the
general division between agreements in restraint of trade and
monopolization contained in sections one and two respectively of the
Sherman Act. 8 As noted below, however, the Sherman Act division
is not followed rigorously; several actions often dealt with under sec-
tion one of the Sherman Act, such as vertical agreements, are dealt
with under subsection D(4) of the Agreed Principles and Rules. Sec-
tion E urges states9 to deter enterprises from engaging in condemned
behavior. States are asked to pass and enforce appropriate legisla-
7. See generall, OECD, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRAC-
TICEs (1979).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976). A similar dichotomy exists in the Treaty of Rome of
1957. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3. Article 85 of the Treaty corresponds roughly to section one of the Sherman
Act. Article 86 corresponds roughly to section two of the Sherman Act.
9. The Agreed Principles and Rules does not define the term "state." International
law is primarily concerned with states that are independent in their external relations.
[Vol. 14:1
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tion and to exchange relevant information. Section F recommends
international action aimed at eliminating the condemned business
practices. Finally, section G establishes a permanent United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Group
of Experts to study and discuss matters relating to the Agreed Princi-
ples and Rules.
B. LEGAL NATURE OF AGREED PRINCIPLES AND RULES
The Agreed Principles and Rules addresses language of obliga-
tion to both states and enterprises: states and enterprises "should"
do or refrain from doing specified activities.' 0 The legal nature of
these obligations depends on the legal authority of the enacting
body, the United Nations General Assembly. Resolutions of the
General Assembly do not legally bind member states, I" nor do they
establish international law. 12 Noncompliance is not grounds for a
See, e.g., J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 129 (6th ed. 1963). Presumably the Agreed
Principles and Rules is in accord.
10. See Agreed Principles and Rules §§ D & E.
11. E.g., I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (2d ed.
1973); Schwartz, Are the OECD and UNCTAD Codes Legally Binding, 11 INT'L LAW.
529, 532 (1977). But see South West Africa Case, [1955] I.C.J. 67, 118-19 (Lauterpacht,
J., concurring). Resolutions of the General Assembly are binding when addressed to
subsidiary organs or secretariats, however. See Schachter, The Evolving International
Law of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 4 (1976).
12. Under some circumstances, General Assembly resolutions may constitute evi-
dence of general principles of international law or of customary international law. I.
BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 14. Brownlie lists the following as examples of "lawmak-
ing" resolutions: The resolution that affirmed the principles of international law recog-
nized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal; the
Resolution on Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons for War Purposes; the Decla-
ration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; the Declara-
tion on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources; and the Declaration of Legal
Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. Id
The contours of the doctrine of international law by assimilation are unsettled, however.
See generally A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971).
Most theorists require evidence of repeated adherence and of opiniojuris, the belief by
states that such adherence is required by international law, before a norm is deemed to
be customary international law. Id at 47-72.
Moreover, in some cases, a General Assembly resolution may have the force of inter-
national law because it is an authoritative interpretation and application of the principles
of the United Nations Charter, which itself has international law status. I. BROWNLIE,
supra note 11, at 15. Examples of such resolutions are the Declaration of the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Declaration of Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations. Id at 15 n. 1.
It is highly unlikely that the Agreed Principles and Rules will acquire international law
status. The document is not an authoritative interpretation of language in the United
Nations Charter, nor is it probable that members of the General Assembly will vote for
the document in the belief that it embodies customary international law. Perhaps, many
years hence, if the document's norms are followed consistently, the document may come
to be considered an articulation of customary international law standards. Indeed, one
noted international law practitioner believes that the Agreed Principles and Rules may
rise quickly to the level of customary international law becauge of the accelerating pace
of international economic relations. Interview with Mr. Daniel J. Plaine (November 20,
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claim for reparations or for judicial remedies. Rather, General
Assembly resolutions are recommendations.
Stating that a nonbinding resolution does not give rise to legal
responsibility, however, is quite different from stating that states are
free to act as if there were no such resolution. General Assembly
resolutions do exert considerable moral or political force by voicing
global beliefs on the propriety of individual and state conduct. Non-
conformists risk disapprobation and, in extreme cases, ostracism
from the world community. One commentator explained this social
pressure as follows:
Various reasons have been advanced to explain why General Assembly rec-
ommendations should exert great influence. Emphasis has been placed on
the fact that the recommendation represents the will of the .majority of
nations and is an expression of world opinion. Public opinion, which is thus
put forth as a principal force supporting recommendations of the General
Assembly, has also been suggested by some as the leading force supporting
obligations established by international law. In the marshalling of world
opinion recommendations of the Assembly enjoy an advantage because of
the opportunity, which is not always available in the sphere of international
law, for full publicity and for a recorded vote. The force of a recommenda-
tion is not derived from a judgment made in an internal court of conscience,
but from a judgment made by an organ of the world community and sup-
ported by many of the same considerations which support positive interna-
tional law. The judgment by the General Assembly as a collective world
conscience is itself a force external to the individual conscience of any given
state. 13
Moreover, those states voting in favor of a resolution containing lan-
guage of obligation directed at themselves seemingly recognize a
commitment, backed by their reputation for integrity, to conform to
the understandings of the agreement. 14 Such states may view the
resolutions as practically controlling even though they reject any
international legal responsibility for conforming to them.
This political or moral commitment may stimulate a corrobora-
tive internal legislative or administrative response that transforms
1980). Whatever the timetable for assimilation, the early history of the document, see
text accompanying notes 27-42 infra, suggests that the lack of a cohesive international
consensus on the document's meaning will preclude such a development. At minimum,
further clarification of the document's standards will be required.
Intriguing enforcement questions are raised if one assumes the Agreed Principles and
Rules does embody customary international law. Might private individuals sue enter-
prises for violations of the code? Or sue states for failing to police errant enterprises? If
so, in what forum? Cf. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). These ques-
tions are beyond the scope of this Article, however.
13. Sloan, The Binding Force of a "Recommendation" of the General Assembly of the
United Nations, [1948] BR. Y.B. INT'L L. 31, 32-33 (footnotes omitted). See also Falk, On
the Quasi-Legislative Competence ofthe GeneralAssembi, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (1966);
J. COSTENDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESoltrloNs 38, 108-09 (1969).
14. Cf. Schacter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71
AM. J. INT'L L. 296, 303 (1977).
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the resolutions into a legal form. If states respect their obligations as
enumerated in the Agreed Principles and Rules, states will enforce
the code through their national legal machinery. Section E of the
Agreed Principles and Rules urges states to adopt and enforce legis-
lation to control conduct specifically condemned in sections B and D
of the document. The code, therefore, may become legally binding
on enterprises because of national legislation enacted and applied in
furtherance of the international agreement. The degree of consensus
behind a resolution reflects the number of states committed to its
tenets and the potency of the pressure that the world community can
exert on those states that are hesitant to comply. The particularity of
the resolution's directives (also a measure of the consensus behind it)
affects whether states can translate the resolution into concrete action
(and whether states can monitor each other's actions pursuant to the
resolution). Resolutions on commercial matters, such as restrictive
business practices, provide the General Assembly with its best
opportunities for optimal impact. Commercial resolutions often can
gather a larger affirmative vote and be more focused than their polit-
ical or moral counterparts.15 Rules for international business trans-
actions often involve less international emotion and less national
pride.
The effect of the language of obligation that the Agreed Princi-
ples and Rules addresses to commercial enterprises is also complex.
Commercial enterprises were not formal parties to the UNCRBP,
nor will they be formal parties to the General Assembly resolution.
They will have, therefore, no special commitment to the language of
the Agreed Principles and Rules. Of course, if states, influenced by
their obligations under the agreement, act to regulate commercial
enterprises accordingly, then enterprises may find themselves for-
mally bound by the precepts of the document. The General Assem-
bly resolution, even if not reflected in state domestic legislation,
however, may still have considerable practical effect on their con-
duct. 16 First, government negotiators in the UNCRBP indirectly
represented enterprises by soliciting and accepting suggestions of
15. Examples of U.N. resolutions whose non-unanimous and partisan nature seri-
ously impaired their potential moral and political force include, inter alia, resolutions
condemning American involvement in Indochina and those condemning Israeli occupa-
tion of lands formerly held by Arab nations. Other examples are the resolutions espous-
ing the New International Economic Order, discussed in note 43 infra and accompanying
text.
16. Davidow & Chiles, The United States and the Issue of the Binding or Voluntary
Nature of the International Codes of Conduct Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, 72
AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 255-56 (1978). Cf. Plaine, The OECD Guidelinesfor Multinational
Enterprises, I 1 INT'L LAW. 339, 343-46 (1977) (discussion of binding nature of OECD
Guidelines).
1981]
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businesses identified with national interests. 17 A state could consider
businesses that refuse to comply with the results of a negotiation
consummated after careful consultation with representatives of
domestic industry to be acting in bad faith. Second, good public and
governmental relations require that companies act in a manner con-
sistent with an apparent global consensus as to good corporate
behavior. International firms are sensitive to public opinion and rec-
ognize the benefits of an affirmative public image.' 8 A company
refusing to comply with the agreement may find it difficult, for
example, to obtain diplomatic protection from its home country,
insurance for its operations, and financing through international
institutions.19 As these informal penalties cumulate, voluntary busi-
ness codes may become impossible to ignore "as they are brought
through the back door."20
Two cases have arisen under the OECD Guidelines for Mul-
tinational Enterprises, a voluntary international code analogous to
the Agreed Principles and Rules, that suggest that voluntary codes
can have a substantial impact on the conduct of transnational firms.
In one case, the Belgian government used the OECD Guidelines to
demand that the Raytheon Company take steps not required by Bel-
gian law. A Raytheon subsidiary located in Belgium went into
bankruptcy, and the assets were insufficient to pay its employees.
United States and Belgian law did not require Raytheon to make up
the deficiency. The Belgian government, however, relying on the
OECD Guidelines, demanded that Raytheon meet the shortfall.
Raytheon, concerned with its relations with the Belgian government,
agreed to a settlement on the matter that was favorable to the
employees. The Belgian government apparently believed that the
Guidelines gave its arguments political legitimacy.21
17. E.g., Letter of John L. Caldwell, Vice President, International, Chamber of Com-
merce of the United States of America, to Richard N. Cooper, Undersecretary of State
for Economic Affairs (July 10, 1980) (on file at Cornell International Law Journal):
I have written to you on several occasions to express certain concerns that the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States has had with the proposed drafts of
the UNCTAD Principles and Rules on Restrictive Business Practices ... I want
to commend the U.S. negotiators for their diligent effort to resolve those issues of
greatest concern to the U.S. business community. Generally, the final text ade-
quately addresses our reservations which I highlighted in prior correspondence
to you on this subject.
Id at 1.
18. But see INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) (U.S. Export Weekly) C-4 (Dec. 5, 1980)
(remarks of J. Shenk: "[M]any corporations have received adverse publicity on many
issues and have not taken their critics seriously.").
19. Plaine, supra note 16, at 343-44.
20. INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) (News and Comment) A-2 (Oct. 22, 1980) (remarks of
Daniel J. Plaine).
21. See Plaine, International Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices, in PRIVATE
INVESTORS ABROAD 1, 6-7 (M. Landwehr ed. 1979).
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In another case, Danish labor unions used the OECD Guide-
lines to their advantage in a strike against a local subsidiary of Hertz.
Hertz decided to transfer workers from other subsidiaries located
elsewhere in Europe to replace the Danish workers. Danish law per-
mits the practice but a paragraph in the OECD Guidelines con-
demns it. The Danish labor unions used the OECD to fuel their
protests. Other European trade unionists joined the fray, and con-
vinced Hertz that the practice should be discontinued and not
repeated. 22
The Agreed Principles and Rules, therefore, may not be yet
another toothless General Assembly pronouncement. The consensus
behind the agreement in the UNCRBP suggests that a substantial
majority of the members of the General Assembly, from all political
blocs, is willing to commit itself to carrying out the document's rec-
ommendations.2 3 The states' interpretations of their obligations are
of immediate concern to transnational businesses that may find
themselves dealing with national legislation or administrative action
undertaken by states in furtherance of the agreement's norms.
Moreover, transnational businesses may discover that states and
their people will expect such businesses to respect the agreement's
proscriptions independent of national legislation.24 International
firms may receive criticism from governments, courts, or segments of
the public (trade unions, for example) for failing to follow the code,
even though it is voluntary.25 A wide range of non-legal but trouble-
some sanctions could await violators. For example, government
pressure could consist of threats of harsh registration, licensing or
taxing requirements, or of lax police protection for business person-
nel or property. At the extreme, violations could provide make-
weight justifications for expropriation of property with minimal or
no compensation. These potentialities have led one international
business expert to fear that the code, although voluntary, will be
"bootstrapped" into mandafory requirements for international
firms.26 Transnational businesses, therefore, should not underesti-
mate the possible potency of the UNCRBP compact.
22. See id at 7; Interview with Mr. Daniel J. Plaine (November 29, 1980).
23. Indeed, the General Assembly passed the UNCRBP agreement by a voice vote.
See addendum infra.
24. See INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) (News and Comment) A-2 (Oct. 22, 1980)
(remarks of Daniel J. Plaine).
25. See id
26. Id at A-i.
19811
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II
PRESSURES FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT ON RESTRICTIVE
BUSINESS PRACTICES
International negotiations on a restrictive business practices
code have gone through two major stages, each characterized by the
identity of the dominant moving parties. In the forties and fifties,
the United States, supported by other developed countries, pushed
for an international compact on restrictive business practices embod-
ying the American postwar economic philosophy of free trade.
27
Twice, international codes were drafted, and each time the United
States scuttled the effort in its final stages.28 Thereafter, U.S. enthu-
27. In 1945, the United States published, with Great Britain as co-sponsor, Proposals
for Expansion of World Trade and Employment, COM. POL'Y SER. 79 (1945). The Pro-
posals contained, inter alia, a chapter on restrictive business practices and recommended
the formation of an international enforcement organization, the International Trade
Organization (ITO). The ITO proposal led to the convening of an international diplo-
matic conference to discuss possible promulgation. Reduction 1/13 of 18 February 1946,
ECOSOC Official Records (1st yr., 1st Sess.) 173 (1946). The conference produced the
Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, reprinted in COM. PoL'Y SER.
114 (1948). Article 46 of the Charter included a general statement condemning anticom-
petitive business practices:
Each member shall take appropriate measures and shall cooperate with the
organization to prevent, on the part of private or public commercial enterprises,
business practices affecting international trade which restrain competition, limit
access to markets, or foster monopolistic control, whenever such practices have
harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade ....
Id at 86. The article also listed six specific practices that were suspect: fixing sale or
lease terms of any product; market division or customer allocation; discrimination
against particular enterprises; limiting or fixing production levels; preventing through
agreement research and development activities; and unwarranted extension of the use of
rights under patents, trademarks or copyrights. Id Although over fifty countries signed
the Charter, it was shelved when the United States Department of State, in late 1950,
publicly withdrew its request for congressional ratification. Furnish, supra note 6, at 326.
In 1951 the State -Department resurrected Chapter V of the Havana Charter as an
independent issue before the United Nations Economic and Social Council. In response,
the Council appointed an adhoc committee of experts to formulate an international sys-
tem of controls based on the Chapter. The substantive provisions of the Havana Charter
were carried over intact into the ECOSOC Draft. Again the United States withdrew its
support at the final moment. Although several other nations had filed statements sup-
porting the Draft, they did not push the matter in the ECOSOC when the United States
filed adverse comments. Furnish, supra note 6, at 327.
Norway, Sweden and Denmark later urged the GATT contracting parties to adopt the
ECOSOC Draft. See generaly GATT Doc. L/283 (1954). The contracting parties, after
five years of study, adopted only a noncommital resolution, however. Members were
encouraged to consult privately on the harmful effects of any restrictive business prac-
tices to which they or their nationals were parties. After the discussions, states were
instructed to submit reports to the GATT Secretariat. See generally GENERAL AGREE-
MENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 170-
79 (9th Supp. 1961).
28. It has been argued that Congress rejected the Havana Charter because of its con-
troversial provisions on commodity stabilization agreements and world-wide full
employment, rather than because of its restrictive business practice provisions. See, e.g.,
19811 RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRWCTICES
siasm on the matter waned. The second stage took place in the sev-
enties, when the developing countries renewed the negotiations.
Their aims, however, were far different from those of the developed
countries in the earlier negotiations. The developing countries
viewed an international code on restrictive business practices as a
weapon for accomplishing a redistribution of wealth from developed
to developing countries. The developed countries participated con-
servatively in the second stage negotiations and continued to insist
that an international code embody free trade principles. The second
stage produced the UNCRBP agreement. The Agreed Principles
and Rules cannot be understood without reference to the milieu of
the negotiations.
A United Nations General Assembly resolution of December
20, 1978 'convened the UNCRBP. 29 The resolution asked the
UNCRBP to negotiate "a set of multilaterally agreed equitable prin-
ciples and rules for the control of restrictive business practices hav-
ing adverse effects on international trade, particularly that of
developing countries, and on the economic development of those
countries. '30 By the time of the promulgation of the resolution,
three successive Groups of Experts appointed by the UNCTAD Sec-
retariat had undertaken preliminary work on a restrictive business
practices code.31 The Groups of Experts published reports on each
Timberg, Restrictive Business Practices as an Appropriate Subject for United Nations
Action, I ANTITRUST BULL. 409, 410 (1955). The ECOSOC Draft has no similar alibi.
The final official U.S. position on the ECOSOC Draft is discussed in Montague, Limita-
tions on What the UN Can Do Successfuly: The Proposed UN Program on Restrictive
Business Practices, I ANTITRUST BULL. 441, 459-61 (1955).
29. United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices, G.A. Res. No. 33/
153 (Dec. 20, 1978) 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 115-16, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1979).
The UNCRBP was held under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD). See U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/Conf./l I, para. (i) (1980).
30. Id
31. UNCTAD, initially conceived as a one-time conference held in Geneva in March
and June of 1964, became a permanent organ of the United Nations under a General
Assembly resolution of 1964. G.A. Res. 1785, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 14, U.N.
Doc. A/5217 (1963); G.A. Res. 1995, 19 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 1, U.N. Doc. A/
5815 (1965). Since this initial session in Geneva, subsequent sessions have been held at
three or four year intervals: New Delhi in 1968; Santiago in 1972; Nairobi in 1976; and
Manila in 1979. The theoretical objective of UNCTAD is to promote international trade
in order to accelerate global economic development. See U.N. DEP'T PUB. INFO.,
EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS 139-40 (9th ed. 1979). In practice, UNCTAD focuses
primarily on the economic problems of developing countries. Indeed, some argue that
Third World advocates have captured the UNCTAD forum.
By 1978, UNCTAD had heard from three successive "4d Hoc Groups of Experts"
appointed to deal with international antitrust problems. The UNCTAD conference in
Chile 1972 had established the FirstAdHoc Group of Experts. UNCTAD Secr., Res. 73
(III), U.N. Doc. TD/180 (1972). See Primoff, International Regulation of Multinational
Corporations and Business-The United Nations Takes Aim, 11 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 287,
288-89 (1976). The group, consisting of academicians acting as private individuals, sub-
mitted a preliminary report on restrictive business practices in 1973. UNCTAD, Report
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of their sessions containing the text of language proposed by various
participants, agreements thereon, and extracts of opening and clos-
ing comments from the participants. These reports provide evidence
of the ratio legis of the code.
The General Assembly resolution establishing the Conference
was passed after the Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts had held its
fifth session. The participants had negotiated the essential structure
and most of the provisions of an Agreed Principles and Rules,
although substantial disagreement over various provisions
remained. 32 The experts were at loggerheads over, inter alia, prefer-
ential treatment for the enterprises of developing countries, the
applicability of the rules to intra-enterprise transactions, the legal
nature of the rules, and specific exceptions to the rules.33 In prepara-
tion for the UNCRBP, the Group of Experts met again in a sixth
session to clarify the areas of disagreement. 34 The UNCRBP took
place in Geneva in two sessions, November 19-December 8, 1979
and April 8-22, 1980.35 Its participants resolved successfully all dis-
of the Ad Hoe Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices in Relation to the
Trade and Development of Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/1 19/Rev. 1
(1974). Later that year, a committee of the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board
(the Board is responsible for implementing UNCTAD decisions between sessions)
refused to endorse the report of the First Group of Experts and asked the Secretary
General of UNCTAD to convene a second group of experts comprised of official govern-
ment representatives. Official Records of the Trade and Development Board, 13th Ses-
sion, Supp. (No. 5) 33-34, U.N. Doc. TD/B/466 (1973). The Second AdHoc Group of
Experts met in October 1975 and February 1976. See U.N. Docs. TD/B/600, TD/B/
C.2/166, TD/B/C.2/AC.5/6 (1976). In its final report, the second group enumerated
areas of agreement and disagreement on the appropriate content of a list of restrictive
business practices likely to affect developing nations. UNCTAD, Report of the Second
Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/
AC.5/6, at 27 (1976). A May 1976 UNCTAD resolution established the Third Ad Hoc
Group of Experts. UNCTAD Res. 9(iv), § 3 (1976). The mandate of the Third AdHoc
Group was to "prepare detailed proposals and recommendations" on, inter alia: "a set of
multilaterally agreed equitable principles and rules for the control of restrictive business
practices having adverse effects on international trade, particularly that of developing
countries, and on the economic development of these countries;" systems for information
exchange and collection on restrictive business practices; and "a model law or laws on
restrictive business practices . . . in order to assist in devising appropriate legislation."
Id
UNCTAD is also sponsoring conferences on a code on transfer of technology. See,
e.g., UNCTAD, Preparation of a Draft Outline of an International Code of Conduct on
Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C6/AC.I/2/Supp. 1 (1975). See Davidow,
supra note 5, at 14-17.
32. Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices
on Its Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/AC.6/18 (1978).
33. Id at 19.
34. Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices
on its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. TD/250, TD/B/C.2/201, TD/B/C.2/AC.6/20 (1979).
For a discussion of the report, see Davidow, The UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices
Code, 13 INT'L LAW. 587 (1979); Gill, The UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Code.-
A Codefor Competitioh4 13 INT'L LAW. 607 (1979).
35. U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/Conf./1 1, supra note 1, para. (i).
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putes over language in the Group of Experts' final draft.
At the UNCRBP and in the UNCTAD Groups of Experts, a
substantial majority of the world's states were officially represented
by three major political blocs of countries known in UNCTAD as
Group B, Group D, and the Group of 77.36 Group B is composed of
industrially developed countries of the West, all of which have mar-
ket economies. 37 Group D is composed of the countries of Eastern
Europe (except Yugoslavia and Rumania, which have joined the
Group of 77) and the Soviet Union.38 The Group of 77 actually con-
sists of approximately one hundred and twenty developing countries,
the bulk of which are in Africa, Latin America, and Southern Asia.39
For the most part, these blocs of countries negotiated as discrete
units. The members of each bloc met first to formulate a common
position and then designated representatives to meet with represent-
atives of the other blocs. 40
36. See, e.g., Report of the Third AdHoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business
Practices on its Sixth Session, supra note 34, at 35. See also Davidow, supra note 5, at 7.
Eighty-eight countries, six international agencies, nine intergovernmental organizations
and ten non-governmental international organizations sent delegates to UNCRBP. U.N.
Doc. TD/RBP/Conf./I I, paras. (x)-(xiv) (1980); U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/Conf./Inf. 1 and 2
(1980).
37. Interviews with Mr. Joel Davidow, Director of Office of Policy Planning, Anti-
trust Division, Department of Justice; Member of United States Delegation to UNCRBP
(Aug. 13 & 27, 1980).
38. Id
39. R. ROTHSTEIN, GLOBAL BARGAINING: UNCTAD AND THE QUEST FOR A NEw
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 194-202 (1979). China is a "group alone." Id. at
111, 195.
China participated at the UNCRBP, but not in the UNCTAD Groups of Experts.
Interviews with Joel Davidow, note 37 supra. See Statements Made at the Closing Meet-
ing of the United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/
RBP/Conf./ 11, paras. 15-16 (1980) [hereinafter cited as UNCRBP Closing Statements].
China, consistent with its history of restrained participation in UNCTAD affairs, did not
play an active role in the UNCRBP negotiations. See R. ROTHSTEIN, supra, at 111. It
simply expressed ideological support for the efforts of the Group of 77. See, e.g.,
UNCTAD Official Records, 17th Session, Report of the Committee on Manufactures on
its Eighth Session, U.N. Docs. TD/B/663, TD/B/C.2/183/Supp. 5, at 14 (1977).
40. The merits of the group decision-making system in UNCTAD have been ques-
tioned. R. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 39, at 194-202; Wex, 4 Code of Conduct on Restrictive
Business Practices: 4 Third Option, 15 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 198, 204-05 (1977); Gossvic,
UNCT4D: North-South Encounter, 568 INT'L CONCILIATION 21 (1968). The system is
cumbersome and complex. Each group or subgroup (there are three regional blocks in
the Group of 77, for example) negotiates a common position. Representatives of each
group then negotiate a common intergroup position in "contact group" sessions. There is
very little contact between members of different groups outside the "contact groups"; the
structure is rigidly pyramidal. Since Group B and the Group of 77 contain a coalition of
interests that often diverge on particulars, the intragroup settlements are fragile and typi-
cally permit little compromise in intergroup negotiations. Id The flexibility displayed by
the Group of 77 in the intergroup negotiation at UNCRBP is therefore unusual.
For an example of an occasional exception to the unit bargaining process in the
UNCTAD discussions on restrictive business practices, however, see Report of the Third
Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices on its Fourth Session, U.N.
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The Group of 77 (supported by Group D) and Group B began
the UNCRBP negotiations with widely differing views of the appro-
priate function of an international compact on restrictive business
practices.41 The Group of 77 was intent on promulgating a code to
enable its constituents to garner a larger share of the fruits of inter-
national trade; its goals were intensely self-serving. Conversely,
Group B sought to increase global allocative and distributive effi-
ciency by perfecting the international competitive process (whether
the Group B goal is, in essence, selfish or virtuous may be debatable,
but the debate is beyond the scope of this Article).42 The efficacy of
the UNCRBP depends on whether the participants successfully inte-
grated these diverse goals and, if so, on whether the language of the
agreement accurately embodies whatever common denominator
exists.
A. THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
At the UNCRBP, the Group of 77 pursued a restrictive business
practices code that would further its program for a "New Interna-
tional Economic Order" (New Order). 43 At its core, the New Order
Doc. TD/B/C.2/AD.6/13, at 24 n.10 (1978) (proposal from "an expert from a socialist
country of Eastern Europe").
41. Compare Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules: Proposal
Submitted by Expert of India on Behalf of the Experts from the Group of 77, Report of
the Third AdHoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices on its First Session,
U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/AC.6/4, Annex 1 (1976) with Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equita-
ble Principles and Rules: Proposal Submitted by the Expert of the United Kingdom on
Behalf of the Experts from Group B, id Annex II.
42. Those arguing that Group B goals are self-effacing claim the following: An inter-
national competitive market system is in everyone's interest because such a system allo-
cates scarce resources so as to maximize the satisfaction of everyone's personal wants.
Moreover, a free trade system provides freedom of opportunity to individuals, who are
limited only by their own skill and resourcefulness. Opponents argue that Group B goals
are self-serving because Group B recognizes that its enterprises will dominate and plun-
der in a competitive system.
43. The basic documents of the New International Economic Order (hereinafter New
Order) include: Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) (6th Spec. Sess.) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974); Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, G.A. Res. 3202, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) (6th Spec. Sess.) 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975); Development and International
Economic Cooperation, G.A. Res. 3362, 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) (7th Spec. Sess.) 3,
U.N. Doc. A/10301 (1975). The history of the New Order is contained in Gwin, The
Seventh Special Session: Toward a New Phase ofRelations Between the Developed and the
Developing States, in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 97-117 (K. Sauvant
& H. Hasenpfluy eds. 1977); R. MEAGHER, AN INTERNATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF
WEALTH AND POWER: A STUDY OF THE CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES
OF STATES (1979). See also Sauvant, Toward the New International Economic Order, in
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra, at 3-19.
In the United Nations Resolution on Development and International Economic Coop-
eration, supra, it is urged that "[rlestrictive business practices adversely affecting interna-
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is a demand for a redistribution of the world's wealth in favor of the
developing countries. 44 The goals of the program include: the
enhancement of control by developing countries over their own
economies; the encouragement of indigenous economic development
in developing countries; the development of an international system
of assistance to developing countries; and preferential treatment for
developing countries in matters concerning international trade.45
New Order documents are infused with declarations of rights of
developing countries and corresponding duties owed such countries
by the developed countries.46 The New Order even includes a
demand for "reparations" to states that are or have been "foreign-
dominated." 47
An important feature of the New Order is an effort by its adher-
ents to wrestle economic power from transnational corporations.
Such corporations are composed of a parent company, traditionally
based in a developed country, and one or more subsidiaries in other
countries.4 8 Transnational corporations tend to be large, able to shift
capital and resources rapidly, and technologically sophisticated.49
tional trade, particularly that of developing countries, should be eliminated and efforts
should be made at the national and international levels with the objective of a set of
equitable principles and rules." This language is repeated in the UNCTAD resolutions
establishing the Groups of Experts. See note 31 supra.
44. Sauvant, supra note 43, at 10.
45. Id See generally E. LASZLO, R. BAKER, JR., E. EISENBERG & V. RAMAN, THE
OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1978); UNCTAD, Trade
and Development Issues in the Context of a New International Economic Order, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/056/Rev. 1 (1975).
A demand for "preferential and nonreciprocal treatment for developing countries,
whenever feasible, in all fields of international cooperation whenever possible" is con-
tained in the Declaration on Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
supra note 43, para. 3(n), in Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New Inter-
national Economic Order, supra note 43, para. 3(b), and in the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, supra note 43, art. 19. Called the "principle of compensatory
inequality," the demand is based on (i) the notion that undeveloped states are so far
"behind" developed states that rules must discriminate in favor of undeveloped states if
they are to catch up, and (ii) the notion that preferential treatment is compensation for
the past exploitation of the third world by developed countries. Fatouros, The Interna-
tional Law of the New International Economic Order: Problems and Challenges for the
United States, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 93, 100 (1980). The arguments are similar to
those that advocates use to justify affirmative action programs in American law. Id.
46. See generally documents cited in note 43 supra.
47. Gwin, supra note 43, at 100.
48. See Sauvant, Controlling Transnational Enterprises: .4 Review and Some Further
Thoughts, in THE NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 43, at 356-403.
49. R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY 4 (1971); Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise:
,4 New Challengefor TransnationalLaw, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739 (1970). The definition of
transnational corporation is the subject of a continuing debate. Participants disagree
over requirements of geographic spread, organizational ties between units, size, marginal
structure, and ownership patterns. See Ahorsni, On the Defnitions of the Multinational
Corporation, 11 Q. REV. ECON. & Bus. 27 (1972); Hadari, The Structure of the Private
Multinational Enterprise, 71 MICH. L. REV. 729 (1973). The United Nations has had
difficulty settling on the proper terminology; it has referred successively to these entities
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Third world leaders publicly justify50 their offensive against transna-
tionals by asserting that the corporations rapaciously extract wealth
from developing nations by underpaying for commodities and labo.r
and by overcharging for their products;51 that the corporations exert
excessive economic control over the affairs of developing nations;52
that the corporations perpetuate the industrial underdevelopment of
as multinational corporations, multinational enterprises and now transnational corpora-
tions. Davidow & Chiles, supra note 16, at 248 n.6. The terminology shift reflects the
belief of the socialist and developing countries that the term "transnational corporations"
emphasizes the transnational character of corporate activities and control as opposed to
the international character of the capital structure of the corporations. There are only a
few corporations with multinational capital structures. Hvoinik, Critique.- Transnational
Corporations in World Development, 1 CTC REP. (United Nations Centre on Transna-
tional Corporations) 36 (No. 8, 1980). Ironically, the developing countries are distaste-
fully discovering that the broadened term arguably includes thousands of intermediate
and small firms of their own operating abroad, and the socialist countries are discovering
that the broadened term can include their foreign trade organizations which have repre-
sentative offices abroad. Id The Soviet Union argues that to include foreign trade orga-
nizations of the socialist countries is a "de-politization" of the term transnational
corporation and "misleads the whole process of setting up effective international meas-
ures to control [transnational corporations]. This approach is an attempt to put on an
equal footing the private exploitative monopolistic form of foreign operations and its
socialist alternative, based on public ownership, equality and mutual benefit." Id
The existence of such entities is a relatively recent phenomenon. Most formed after
World War II in response to the liberalized world trade facilitated by the Bretton Woods
institutions and to the growth of rapid communications technology. D. WALLACE,
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 35-72 (1976).
50. The true reasons for the political offensive against transnationals (some of which
are not often publicly aired by those who are motivated by them) are more multifaceted.
Professor Vernon states:
Multinational enterprises. . . have served as unwitting and unwilling lightning
rods for a number of quite different forces in the developing countries. Their
presence has drawn the hostility of those eager to develop a strong national iden-
tity free of outside influence, those repelled by the costs of industrialization,
those at war with capitalism as a system, and those distrustful of the politics of
the rich industrialized states, especially the United States.
R. VERNON, STORM OVER THE MULTINATIONALS 145-46 (1977). See also Coonrod, The
United Nations Code of Conductfor Transnational Corporations, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 273,
278 n.26 (1977).
51. Henari Boumediene of Algeria, President of the Non-Aligned Countries, opened
the Sixth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly with the following remarks:
[The effort to bring the task of recovery to fruition will remain without effect so
long as international monopolies and multinational corporations, those past
masters at the art of making concessions in order to safeguard the essentials,
continue to control the multiple mechanisms whereby the wealth of the poor
countries is transferred away from them. . . . This battle, the latest manifesta-
tion of the ongoing confrontation between the dialectic of domination and plun-
dering on the one hand, and the dialectic of emancipation and recovery on the
other, revolves around the same ultimate stakes: the control and use of the fruits
of resources belonging to the countries of the third world.
U.N. Doc. A/PV.220, paras. 52 & 54 (1974). The Sixth Special Session produced three of
the four basic New Order documents cited in note 43 supra. See also Perlmutter, Perplex-
ing Routes to M.NE. Legitimacy: Code of Conduct/or Technology Transfer, II STAN. J.
INT'L STUD. 169, 171-76 (1976). See generally R. BARNET & R. MILLER, GLOBAL REACH
(1974); R. VERNON, note 50 supra.
52. Coonrod, supra note 50, at 278.
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the third world through a global division of labor and technology;5 3
that the corporations pursue management strategies designed to
maximize their profits at the expense of national goals of the devel-
oping countries;54 and that the corporations serve as conduits for the
foreign and economic policies of the corporate parent's host coun-
try. 5 Each of these claims is grounded on the ability of transna-
tional corporations to exploit positions of market power in domestic
markets, power typically generated through their control over
advanced technology, their sophisticated managerial skills and
financial resources, and their ability to take advantage of economies
of scale.56
Developing countries could simply prohibit transnational cor-
porations from operating or otherwise investing within their bounda-
ries (and this is done in many countries in certain industries),5 7 but
developing countries generally recognize the need for foreign invest-
ment to foster economic development.5 8 Accordingly, developing
countries continue to solicit, and even demand, foreign investment
but, at the same time, seek to strengthen their control over business
conduct affecting their domestic economies.5 9 According to the
Group of 77, a code of restrictive business practices should apply
only to restrict Western industry and should exempt industry of the
Group of 77. In addition, New Order adherents seek to prohibit
Western transnational corporations from engaging in business prac-
tices that lessen the export potential, purchasing freedom, or techno-
logical progress of industries of developing nations. 60 Injury to the
industry of developing nations, not injury to the competitive struc-
ture of an international or domestic market, is their criterion for
relief. It was clear from the outset, therefore, that the Group of 77
did not consider the proper purpose of the code to be the preserva-
53. Id at 278-85; R. VERNON, supra note 50, at ch. 7. The claim that transnational
corporations have a negative economic impact has not been substantiated, however. Id
54. Vagts, supra note 49, at 756-77; R. VERNON, supra note 50, at ch. 7.
55. Coonrod, supra note 50, at 282; R. VERNON, supra note 50, at ch. 7.
56. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 1178 (2d ed. 1977).
Allegiances may shift from home countries to host countries, however, due to overriding
corporate interests. See, e.g., A. SAMPSON, SEVEN SISTERS 297-538 (1975).
57. Many countries protect their financial institutions and communications industries
from foreign investment. Transportation and defense-related industries are also often
protected from foreign investment. Sauvant, supra note 48, at 361.
58. R. VERNON, supra note 50, at 159-61, 210; Vagts, supra note 49, at 759-60.
59. Report of the SecondAdHoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices,
supra note 3 1, at 35. See also Report of Third4d Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive
Business Practices in its First Session, Proposal Submitted on Behalf of the Group of 77,
U.N. Doc. No. TD/B/C.2/AC.6/4, Annex 1 (1979).
60. Davidow, International Antitrust Codes and Multinational Enterprises, 2 Loy.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 17, 21 (1979).
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tion and promotion of international competition.6'
The resort of developing countries to international negotiations
on restrictive business practices reflects their perception that individ-
ual states are relatively powerless against transnational corpora-
tions.62 The territorial bounds of enforcement jurisdiction limit a
state's ability to gather information about business practices that
originate with decisions in headquarters or major offices of transna-
tional corporations located elsewhere. 63 Moreover, individual states
fear that transnational corporations will relocate in states that take a
more benign view toward business practices. 64 Finally, most devel-
oping states do not have the expertise and resources to draft appro-
priate national legislation or to enforce such legislation if
promulgated. 65
Third world leaders have adopted, therefore, international strat-
egies. First, they seek to encourage, and even require, uniform legis-
lation in developing states regulating restrictive business practices.66
It is believed that this would prevent transnational corporations from
taking advantage of their international mobility by playing one state
off against another.67 Second, third world leaders seek to require
that developed countries aid in the control of transnational corpora-
tions for the benefit of developing countries. 68 Developed countries,
it is argued, should compel transnational corporations to provide
developing countries with requested information. Furthermore,
61. Report of the Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices,
supra note 31, at 4.
62. See id at 7.
63. Report of the Group of Eminent Persons, The Impact of Multinational Corpora-
tions on Development and on International Relations, U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. 1, ST/
ES4/6, at 53 (1974). The Group noted that making information available to host coun-
tries could "well be a most important first step in assisting developing countries in their
dealings with multinational corporations." Id For a summary of instances where inves-
tigations on restrictive business practices were stymied by the inability of national
authorities to obtain information that was foreignly held, see UNCTAD Secretariat,
Information for the Effective Control of Restrictive Business Practices affecting the
Trade and Development of Developing Countries and the Role of UNCTAD in the Col-
lection and Dissemination of Information, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/AC.6/6, at 8 (1977).
64. Coonrod, supra note 50, at 280; Davidow & Chiles, supra note 16, at 257.
65. Report of Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts, supra note 31, at 7-8.
66. See, e.g., First Draft of a Model Law or Laws on Restrictive Business Practices to
Assist Developing Countries in Devising Appropriate Legislation, U.N. Doc. TD/B/
C.2/AC./16/Rev. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Model Antitrust Law for Developing
Countries].
67. A third alternative, the creation of a supranational enforcement organization, has
not been pursued. Davidow & Chiles, supra note 16, at 258. Davidow & Chiles attribute
this to the developing countries' "glorification of nationalism and their fear and rejection
of laws or law enforcement lying outside of national control." Id The principal purpose
of an international code, therefore, is to reinforce "national jurisdiction and control over
the activities of transnational enterprises." Fatouros, supra note 45, at 104.
68. See authorities cited in note 64 supra.
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developed countries should themselves accept the burden of policing
business practices of transnational corporations, even if the practices
in issue have no adverse effect on developed country markets. At a
minimum, third world leaders demand that the restrictive business
practice laws applied by developed countries to conduct adversely
affecting their own economies be applied with equal force to conduct
affecting the economies of developing states.69
In accordance with these goals, the Group of 77's initial draft of
the Agreed Principles and Rules included nonreciprocal proscrip-
tions; it condemned only practices adjudged to affect adversely "the
trade and development of developing countries. ' 70 The draft incor-
porated a partial list of condemned practices, but the general defini-
tion was open-ended 7' and to be read in accordance with, among
others, the following objectives:
(a) To increase the share of developing countries in world trade, in particu-
lar through an expansion and diversification in their exports of manu-
factures;
(c) To maximize the benefits and to minimize the disadvantages to trade
and development deriving from the operations of transnational corpora-
tions so as to ensure that they may make a positive contribution to the
trade and development of developing countries;
(e) To strengthen the participation of national enterprises of developing
countries in their imports and exports of manufactures and semi-manu-
factures with a view to the improvement of countervailing power in
world trade and industrialization, and especially to that of the transna-
tional corporation.72
The draft demanded that all governments "ensure that enterprises
...refrain from the use of such practices," and asked UNCTAD to
monitor national enforcement efforts and settle disputes.73 It also
obligated governments to require enterprises to gather and submit
business data on production, customs, prices and internal accounting
practices, and to transmit such data to other interested governments.
69. See Report of the Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business
Practices, supra note 31, at 7-8.
70. d at 35.
71. Id at 37. The "illustrative list" included practices commonly prohibited in
Group B countries, such as price-fixing, boycotts, market or customer allocation by quota
as to sales and production, exclusive dealing and so forth. The list also included, how-
ever, restraints on transactions between parent and subsidiary corporations that are not
found in the antitrust codes of Group B countries. Id paras. (g)-(j), at 37. See also U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 25-26 (1977).
72. Report of the Second.4d Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices,
supra note 31, paras. 74(a)(i)-(v), at 37. Governments of developed market-economy
countries were also admonished to refrain from encouraging business practices abroad
that were considered domestically unacceptable. Id para. 74(i), at 43.
73. Id paras. 74(h) & (1), at 37-38.
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B. THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Developed countries view the control of restrictive business
practices as a means of maintaining and promoting market competi-
tion.74 They therefore define restrictive business practices as those
practices that interfere with the efficient use and allocation of eco-
nomic resources by distorting the competitive process. 75 Developed
countries view a restrictive business practices code as a neutral set of
rules for participants in the competitive process; such a code should
not protect the interests of a few select combatants. 76 Moreover,
74. See id at 9-10; Davidow, Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust
Law in a Changing World, 8 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 895, 901 (1976); UNCTAD Secre-
tariat, Issues in Connection With the Formulation of a Set of Multilaterally Agreed
Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N.
Doc. TD/B/C.2/AC.6/2, para. 7 (1976).
75. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger announced the current position of the United
States on an international restrictive business practices code at the Seventh Special Ses-
sion of the U.N. in 1975. The Secretary implied that the competition-oriented principles
behind United States legislation should also define any international antitrust code when
he noted that the United States "has long been vigilent" against business practices that
set prices or restrain supplies and that the United States "stand[s] by the same principles
internationally." H. Kissinger, Global Consensus and Economic Development (address
read by D.P. Moynihan, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, before U.N. General
Assembly, Sept. 1, 1975), reprinted in 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 425, 433 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Speech of Secretary Kissinger].
Secretary Kissinger's statement represented a marked policy shift toward the New
Order. In 1974, the United States refused to participate in preparations for the Sixth
Special Session of the U.N., labelling the New Order a product of the "tyranny of the
majority." See Davidow, supra note 5, at 37. In his 1975 statement, however, the Secre-
tary called on the world to "put aside the sterile debate over whether a new economic
order is required or whether the old economic order is adequate." Speech of Secretary
Kissinger, supra, 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 426. See also Statement of Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance of May 30, 1977, before the Conference on International Economic Cooper-
ation and Development, reprinted in 76 DEP'T STATE BULL. 645 (1977) (United States
policy is "to build a new international economic system"). Without agreeing to the basic
goals of the New Order, therefore, the United States has indicated its willingness to dis-
cuss specific economic issues.
While explanations for this shift from confrontation to conciliation are diverse, most
commentators agree that the position recognizes that a "divide and conquer" approach to
third world solidarity will fail. See Gwin, supra note 43, at 106-14. Perhaps the United
States believes that third world leaders, if invited to offer particularized and workable
proposals on international economic problems, will find it difficult to continue to rely on
general ideological rhetoric. The willingness of the United States to confer on these
issues continues to date, and may serve to rebut the third world contention that the
United States is insensitive to the problems of poorer nations.
76. Secretary Kissinger stated that the standards should be "balanced" and "fair":
Host governments in turn must treat transnational enterprises equitably, without
discrimination among them, and in accordance with international law.
Principles established for transnational enterprises should apply equally to
domestic enterprises, where relevant. Standards should be addressed not only to
privately owned corporations, but also to state-owned and mixed transnational
enterprises, which are increasingly important in the world economy.
Speech of Secretary Kissinger, supra note 75, 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 433.
The Secretary implied a quid pro quo for any American agreement to an international
code: respect by all states for the private ownership and contract rights of transnational
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developed countries enthusiastically hail transnational corporations
as "the most effective engines" of global development.77 They
believe that the corporations, as participants in the international
competitive struggle, act as efficient allocators of global resources, as
a force for increased global economic integration, and even as an
effective equalizer of international income, transferring capital and
technology to developing countries.78
The wealth readjustment approach of the New Order is anti-
thetical to this efficiency-based theory.79 Accordingly, the initial
response of the developed countries to New Order initiatives on an
international code for controlling restrictive business practices was
guarded. The original position of the Group B countries is con-
tained in two documents, a Group B proposal submitted to the
SecondAdHoe Group of UNCTAD Experts80 and voluntary guide-
lines formulated under the auspices of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD).8t The UNCTAD
Group B proposal recognized "that there might be a number of vol-
untary principles concerning remedies at the national and interna-
tional level which might be of value and multilaterally acceptable." 82
The Group B countries urged that the code be voluntary, because the
corporations, and the elimination of government sponsored cartels that artificially set
prices of commodities or otherwise limit their supply. Id The United States did not
follow up on either demand in the UNCRBP negotiations.
77. Secretary Kissinger has stated that transnational corporations "may well be one
of the most effective engines of development .... [They] have been powerful instru-
ments of modernization ... in the developing countries, where there is often no substi-
tute for their ability to marshal capital, management skills, technology and initiative."
Id., 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 432.
78. Coonrod, supra note 50, at 285-86. See also Ball, Cosmocorp: The Importance of
Being Stateless, 2 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 25, 28 (1967). Those who place extreme confi-
dence in transnational corporations view national sovereignty as an obstacle to their full
efficiency and argue that the world should remove national incorporation restrictions.
Id. at 28-29.
79. Only through an argument based on the questionable infant industry exception
can one claim the two theories are consistent. Cf. III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW 1 912b-912c (1978 & Supp. 1980).
80. Report of the Second AdHoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices,
supra note 31, at 32-35. See also Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts on
Restrictive Business Practices on its First Session, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/AC.6/4, Annex
11 (1976) (proposal submitted by United Kingdom on behalf of Group B).
81. OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Doc. 21 (76)04/1,
Annex (1976), reprinted in 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 84 (1976) [hereinafter cited as OECD
Guidelines]. See Davidow, Some Reflections on the OECD Competition Guidelines, 22
ANTITRUST BULL. 441 (1977); Hawk, The OECD Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises:
Competition, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 241 (1977). The OECD has 24 member nations:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Ger-
many. Id at 243 n. 11.
82. Report of The Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Prac-
tices, supra note 31, at 32-33.
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alternatives-a treaty creating an international court to enforce the
code or a treaty binding states to enact the code into national legisla-
tion-were impractical. The Group B spokesmen justified the posi-
tion in the Group of Experts as follows:
In the foreseeable future, national or regional law, as perhaps guided by
model laws, would be the most appropriate instrument for the enforcement
of binding rules on enterprises. The experts also stressed that there existed
no worldwide international machinery for the enforcement and interpreta-
tion of any conceivable worldwide restrictive business practice rules, and lit-
tle likelihood, given the wide divergence in national objectives, attitudes and
experience in this field, that countries would be prepared to create and accept
binding international enforcement and adjudication. It was believed that
any attempt to enforce general principles for enterprises separately in each
nation would lead to wide variations in interpretation, procedures and sanc-
tions, and that this would be unfair and inequitable, would create an unsta-
ble and unpredictable atmosphere in which enterrises would be forced to
operate, and exacerbate conflicts among nations.
8
This is a far cry from the United States proposals of 1945.84 In 1945,
the United States urged the establishment of an international organi-
zation (the ITO) that could hear complaints from states or private
parties. An ITO decision would have bound states to "take action"
against duly declared harmful restraints.85
The Group B UNCTAD proposal suggested only that an inter-
national agreement recommend that states "strengthen, adopt or
seriously consider adopting legislation" based "primarily on the
principles of avoiding monopoly or its abuse and preventing undue
restraints on competition. '8 6 States were encouraged to interpret
and implement such legislation "by means of legal procedures ensur-
ing fair and factual determination of the issues, treating enterprises
equitably and without differentiation based on foreign origin or con-
trol."8 7 The proposal referred to the same list of condemned busi-
ness practices that the Group of 77 had incorporated in its
preliminary proposal, but impliedly condemned only those practices
that tended to interfere with the efficient use of economic
resources.88 The Group B proposal gave maximum leeway to
national prerogative, by excepting "practices that are generally or
specifically accepted under applicable national or international
law."89 Finally, the proposal urged states to cooperate in making
83. Id. at 33.
84. See Suggested Charter for an International Organization of The United Nations,
art. 37(5), Dep't State PubI. 2927, COM. POL'Y SER. 106 (1947).
85. Id
86. See Report of the Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business
Practices, supra note 31, paras. 73(d)(i) & (d)(ii).
87. Id at 33-34.
88. See id at 32-33.
89. Id at 34.
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"general information" available to other states. 90
The Group B countries negotiated the OECD Guidelines 9' as a
prelude to UNCRBP, and offered them as a model for any interna-
tional compact.92 The OECD Guidelines focus on competitive
effect: the Guidelines condemn monopolization, 93 trade restric-
tions94 and, in certain cases, participation in cartels or restrictive
agreements. 95 The Guidelines ask enterprises to publish regularly
financial statements providing countries with details on company
structure, sales, capital investments, financing, research and develop-
ment, accounting policies, and "policies followed in respect of intra-
group pricing." 96
The OECD Guidelines call for review and consultation proce-
dures to help implement the code. 97 A Committee on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises is established to "hold an
exchange of views on matters relating to the guidelines" and report
to the Council.98 Business and organized labor are represented in
the discussions through the Business and Industry Advisory Com-
mittee and the Trade Union Advisory Committee, respectively.99
Individual businesses may be invited to participate in the discus-
sions, but the Guidelines admonish the Committee to "not reach
90. Id.
91. OECD Guidelines, note 81 supra.
92. Davidow, supra note 5, at 15.
93. OECD Guidelines, supra note 81, at 86.
94. Id
95. Id
96. Id
97. Decision of the Council on Inter-Governmental Consultation Procedures on the
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, reprinted in 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 87 (1976).
In 1978 and 1980, the OECD Council issued further recommendations to member states.
See Davidow, Extraterritorial Antitrust: An American View 1-2 (Dep't Justice, March
12, 1981) (copy of speech on file at Cornell International Law Journal). The recommen-
dations urge member states to enforce prohibitions on restructive business practices and
to consult and cooperate with each other on national prosecutions. Id.
The first major OECD resolution in the restrictive business practices area was promul-
gated in 1967. The members agreed to cooperate through joint notification of investiga-
tions and proceedings that affect each other's interests. See Recommendation of the
Council of OECD Concerning Co-Operation Between Member Countries on Restrictive
Business Practices Affecting International Trade, reprinted in 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 370
(1698). Since 1973, the OECD has provided a voluntary conciliation procedure, under
which restrictive business practice experts from other countries attempt to find mutually
agreeable solutions to problems occasioned by practices originating in one country and
adversely affecting the interests of another. Recommendation of the Council (OECD)
Concerning a Consultation and Conciliation Procedure on Restrictive Business Practices
Affecting International Trade, reprinted in 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 283 (1974). The proce-
dure has never been used, probably because of the member states' reluctance to permit
an international tribunal to judge their antitrust policies. See Davidow, supra, at 28.
98. Id para. 1, 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 87.
99. Id para. 2, 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 87.
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conclusions on the conduct of individual enterprises."'' 00
In sum, the goals of Group B at UNCRBP were very limited.
Group B "believed that voluntary principles could help to harmo-
nize international opinion about restrictive business practices, shape
the general behavior of most enterprises, and facilitate international
co-operation."'' o0 According to Group B, harmonized international
opinion could ease international tensions over the application of
national antitrust law to foreign concerns or foreign acts.' 0 2 United
States antitrust laws, for example, penalize actions abroad that affect
adversely American domestic commerce. 0 3 Americans are thus pre-
vented from using foreign jurisdictions as a haven for agreements
that flout domestic antitrust laws, and Americans and foreign
nationals are prevented from acting to deprive United States con-
sumers of the benefits of competition among importers or among
domestic and foreign sources of supply.1i 4 Foreign governments
have reacted to suits against their nationals with diplomatic protests
and legislation blocking the access of American courts to foreign
documents. 0 5 Moreover, in extreme cases, foreign courts have
blocked the enforcement of American antitrust decrees. '0 6 An inter-
national antitrust code could eliminate some of these tensions of uni-
lateralism by harmonizing international antitrust standards.1
0 7
Foreign states will understand, respect and even aid the efforts of
their compeers to regulate activity affecting domestic markets, and
100. Id para. 3, 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 87.
101. Report of The Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Prac-
tices, supra note 31, at 33.
102. See Davidow, supra note 34, at 587-88.
103. See, Address of J. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney, Antitrust Division (Aug. 9,
1978), reprinted in [1978] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 9150.
104. Id
105. The United Kingdom, for example, enacted legislation in 1980 in response to
U.S. antitrust prosecutions of U.K. nationals in the uranium and shipping industries.
The U.K. law establishes machinery to prohibit citizens from complying with requests
for documents situated in the U.K. if the legal proceeding in the United States is con-
cerned with possible violations of antitrust law. Furthermore, the law establishes a cause
of action in U.K. courts for nationals to recover two-thirds of any treble damage award
suffered at the hands of specified antitrust plaintiffs in United States courts. See The
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 1I, reprinted in 959 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) F-I to F-2 (Apr. 10, 1980). See generally Flexner, Foreign Discovery
and U.S. Antitrust Policy-The Conflict Resolving Mechanisms, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 315 (1979); Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Anti-
trust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612 (1979). See also Stanford, The Application of the Sher-
man Act to Conduct Outside the United States: A View from Abroad, I 1 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 195 (1978). France was the most recent addition to the list of at least twenty coun-
tries that have promulgated statutes of this type. See notes 245-49 infra and accompany-
ing text.
106. See, e.g., British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Clam Indus., Ltd., [1952] 2 All
E.R. 780 (C.A.).
107. See, e.g., The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and Inter-
national Relations, U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. 1, ST/ESA/6 (1974).
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will expect the same treatment in return. Of course, even harmo-
nized standards will not eliminate distrust of the fairness of foreign
tribunals. Moreover, the reason that Group B countries reject a
treaty binding states to enforce internationally agreed principles-
the lack of a workable consensus on a restrictive business practices
approach-also raises substantial doubt over whether a voluntary
code will coalesce international views enough to lessen significantly
the tensions created by unilateral enforcement.
Less frequently argued, but also plausible as a Group B goal, is
the notion that a voluntary international code, if based on principles
of competition, could shape enterprise behavior to maximize global
allocative efficiency and, thereby, enhance global wealth. 0 8
Increased global efficiency could have beneficial effects in American
markets. For example, a price-fixing agreement between industries
in countries A and B, raising the price of goods to a country C pur-
chaser, which sells products incorporating the goods to the United
States, is not within the cognizance of American courts, even though
the agreement may affect American commerce. The code could, by
influencing the behavior of the offending industries directly, or by
influencing the governments in A, B, or C to adopt and enforce legis-
lation prohibiting price-fixing, aid indirectly United States consum-
ers. Moreover, foreign countries with increased wealth (because of
their increased efficiency in allocating their resources) could provide
the United States with economic benefits through augmented inter-
national trade opportunities, and with political benefits, through the
easing of tensions caused by large disparities in economic status
among states.'0 9 Again, however, those potential benefits depend on
the fidelity of states to the competitive principles behind the code, a
fidelity found only in Western states.
An international antitrust code could provide more tangible
benefits to the Group B countries if it contained restrictions, even if
voluntary, on state sponsored commodity cartels such as the Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the International
Bauxite Association, and the Association of Iron Ore Exporting
108. See, e.g., Gwin, supra note 43, at 110-1 1. See also Fredericks, Basic Problems of
the WorldEconomy, in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 43, at
87-88.
109. A more callous version of the goal would hold that the United States should push
free trade principles because United States corporations can best exploit such a milieu;
United States corporations will be the largest and most powerful forces in such an inter-
national market. The recent success of Japanese and West German industries appears to
put the premise of the goal in jeopardy, however. Moreover, even if the United States
representatives in UNCTAD and UNCRBP held such a view, it is unlikely that they
would have publicly acknowledged it.
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Countries. 1 0 State sponsored cartels are generally beyond the reach
of United States antitrust legislation."' In 1945, the United States
and over fifty other states were willing to speak directly on state
sponsored restrictive business practices," 12 but no similar willingness
exists today. The developing countries claim, as a basic New Order
principle, a "right to associate in organizations of primary commod-
ity producers in order to develop their national economies."' ' 3 They
consider commodity cartels as necessary countervailing forces to
transnational corporations. Moreover, a restriction aimed at limiting
sovereign prerogatives in this area is a two-edged sword.' "4 It would
affect legislation in Group B countries, such as the Webb-Pomerene
Export Trade Act in the United States, that permit export agree-
ments among nationals."Is In addition, the belief commonly held in
the United States that the New Order advocates are using the United
States alternately as a punching-bag and a lunch-line instills a gen-
eral reluctance in the United States to surrender any sovereign pre-
rogatives in response to New Order program demands."t 6
Americans retain a deep suspicion that other states do not fully
abide by neutral free trade principles and thus are tempted to favor
their own enterprises facing foreign challenges.' '7 Consequently,
110. See Sauvant, supra note 48, at 368-82.
11I. A foreign state faced with an antitrust action in United States federal courts can
raise the defense of sovereign immunity to bar recovery. Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602(a) (1976). See International Ass'n of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979). See generally Comment,
Defenses to Actions Against Foreign States Under the United States Antitrust Laws, 20
HARV. INT'L L.J. 583 (1979).
112. The Havana Charter allowed exceptions to its Chapter V restrictive business
practice prohibitions only if essential national security interests were at stake. Havana
Charter, supra note 27, art. 99.
113. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties, supra note 43, art. 5.
114. For example, an early draft of the Agreed Principles and Rules contained a pro-
vision directing nations to refrain from "fostering" the participation of enterprises in
cartels. The Group of 77 wanted the provision to be directed solely at developed coun-
tries. Group B argued that the provision should condemn participation in international
cartels as opposed to national cartels. Both the Group of 77 and Group D insisted that
national as well as international cartels be included. See Davidow, supra note 34, at 595-
96. The provision was dropped altogether from the final version.
115. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976). The Act provides a specific exemption from the anti-
trust laws to permit firms to establish export associations if the associations do not inter-
fere with domestic competition. See United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export
Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968). It appears, however, that the United States should jump at
the opportunity to "trade" the Act for a prohibition of international commodity cartels.
For a critical analysis of the Act, see REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE
REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES 295-307 (1979). Efforts continue, how-
ever, to expand the scope of the Act. Paugh, Antitrust Princiles and U S. Trade Laws.- A
Review of Current Areas of Conflict, 12 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 540, 598-608 (1980).
116. Vernon, supra note 50, at 206-07.
117. Cf Menzies, U.S. Companies in Unequal Combat, FORTUNE, April 9, 1979, at
102.
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Group B was careful to except state sponsored practices from con-
demnation in all its UNCTAD and UNCRBP proposals.
C. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE
AND THE SOVIET UNION
At the UNCRBP, the socialist countries of Group D, dominated
by the Soviet Union, sympathized with the aims of the Group of 77.
Moreover, Group D sought control of restrictive business practices
because it believes that such practices are undertaken by Western
transnational corporations to the direct disadvantage of its industry.
Group D views national foreign trade cartels in Group B countries
as particularly harmful. The remarks of a Group D spokesman to
the Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts summarize the major tenets of
the Group D position:
The spokesman for the experts from Group D said that the socialist countries
regarded control of restrictive business practices as one of the most important
tasks in the reconstruction of international economic relations on an equita-
ble and democratic basis and the elimination from such relations of all forms
of discrimination, inequality, diktat and exploitation. The socialist countries'
concern with the elimination of restrictive business practices was derived
from their position of principle in matters of international cooperation and
was based both on solidarity with the peoples of the developing countries
and in their struggle for the construction of an independent national econ-
omy, against neo-colonialism and against exploitation by foreign capital and
on the desire to eliminate the artificial impediments and barriers whereby
restrictive business practices hampered the development of mutually advan-
tageous and equitable trade and economic relations between East and
West.' 18
The Group D and the Group of 77 positions diverged, however, on
the issue of whether the code should cover state-owned enterprises.
Group D argued that state-owned enterprises should be exempt
because none fit the definition of "transnational corporations," and
because none in fact engage in restrictive business practices.' '9 The
Group of 77 took a noncommittal stand on the issue. Group B vig-
orously opposed the exclusion, and refused to sign an agreement that
contained it.
118. Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group on Restrictive Business Practices on its Sixth
Session, supra note 34, at 40. See also Report of the ThirdAd Hoc Group on Restrictive
Business Practices on its Fifth Session, supra note 32, at 4 (remarks of Group D spokes-
man: "[E]nterprises in the socialist countries were themselves being subjected by trans-
national corporations and other capitalist monopolies to restrictive business practices
which were often related to and interlinked with official political discrimination.").
119. See Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Prac-
tices on its Fifth Session, note 32 supra. See also note 49 supra.
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III
ANALYSIS OF AGREED PRINCIPLES AND RULES
A. STANDARDS FOR CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
1. The Proscriptions Defined
Assuming an enterprise agrees to follow the Agreed Principles
and Rules, what acts must it refrain from undertaking? In assessing
the specifics of the compact's prohibitions, the enterprise will note
that the compact has three prominent characteristics. First, if West-
ern usage is assumed, it is more lenient, in all respects but two, than
United States antitrust law.' 20 Second, if Western usage is not
assumed, the language of the compact admits of diverse interpreta-
tions on fundamental matters.121 Third, the compact does provide a
weak but potentially operative mechanism for on-going interpreta-
tion. ' 22
Sections B and D outline the cardinal definitions of those prac-
tices that the Agreed Principles and Rules condemns. Section B
defines "restrictive business practices" as
acts or behaviour of enterprises which, through an abuse or acquisition and
abuse of a dominant position of market power, limit access to markets or
otherwise unduly restrain competition, having or being likely to have adverse
effects on international trade, particularly that of developing countries, and
on the economic development of these countries, or which through formal,
informal, written or unwritten agreements or arrangements among enter-
prises have the same impact.'
23
The definition has four components, each requiring further elabora-
tion: "enterprises"; 124 "dominant position of market power";' 25 acts
in "abuse" of such a market position that "limit access to markets or
otherwise unduly restrain competition"; 26 and "agreements" that
have the "same impact."' 27
The Agreed Principles and Rules specifies that "enterprises"
includes all forms of legal associations, "irrespective of the mode of
creation or control or ownership, private or state, which are engaged
in commercial activities."' 28 Later provisions make it clear that the
proscriptions of the document are not limited to transnational corpo-
rations, but "apply irrespective of whether such practices involve
120. The two more stringent provisions are discussed in notes 134-42, 172-78 infra and
accompanying text.
121. See notes 141-42, 166 infra and accompanying text.
122. See notes 198-219 infra and accompanying text.
123. Agreed Principles and Rules § B(i)(1).
124. See notes 128-133 infra and accompanying text.
125. See notes 135-42 infra and accompanying text.
126. See notes 143-52 infra and accompanying text.
127. See notes 153-55 infra and accompanying text.
128. Agreed Principles and Rules § B(i)(3).
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enterprises in one or more countries."' 29 The term "commercial
activities" is left undefined. A later provision, however, stipulates
that the document's restrictions apply "to all transactions in goods
and services."' 30 This provision suggests that the distinction between
commercial and governmental activities may turn on whether the
state acts as a regulator of commerce or as a participant in the pro-
duction or sale of a commercial good or service. The distinction
invites difficulty: are two states regulating legitimately when they
agree with each other to extract uniform royalties from, or set pro-
duction limits on their privately owned mineral industries, but regu-
lating illegally when they agree to set production limits on state-
owned industries? The test will be difficult to apply in practice.' 3'
The willingness of Group D to agree to the inclusion of state-
owned corporations came late in the drafting process and was a sur-
prise to Group B representatives. Perhaps Group D members
believe that section C(6) will enable them to exempt state-owned
corporations by appropriate legislation. 132 Equally plausible is the
belief among Group D representatives that, since state-owned enter-
prises never engage in the condemned practices, the inclusion is
harmless.' 33
Section B also explains that "'[d]ominant position of market
power' refers to a situation where an enterprise, either by itself or
acting together with a few other enterprises, is in a position to con-
trol. . . [a] relevant market."' 134 The "acting together" language is
ambiguous as to whether it includes shared monopoly, 35 tacit collu-
sion 136 or conscious parallelism,' 37 all much-debated concepts in
U.S. antitrust law.' 38 These theories attack non-collusive but inter-
dependent conduct in oligopolistic sectors of industry. 139 Members
129. Id §B(ii)(4). See also id §§B(ii)(5), (6).
130. Id § B(ii)(5) (emphasis added).
131. Cf. Comment, supra note 11I, at 585-87 (application of commercial activities
exception in Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
132. See notes 253-54 infra and accompanying text.
133. In statements made at the closing of UNCRBP, the Soviet Union, on behalf of
Group D, reiterated its position "that the use of restrictive business practices is alien to
their State enterprises because of the legal, social and economic conditions existing in
those countries, in which those enterprises carry on independent commercial activities."
UNCRBP Closing Statements, supra note 39, para. 14(b). Cf. Hvoinik, note 49 supra.
134. Agreed Principles and Rules § B(2).
135. See, e.g., III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 79, § 840.
136. See, e.g., Posner, Oligopoy and the Antitrust Laws: 4 Suggested Approach, 21
STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1974).
137. See L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 110 (1976).
138. Canadian law on the issue is also uncertain. E.g., Stenbury & Reschenthaler,
Oligopoly and Conscious Parallelism: Theory, Policy and the Canadian Cases, 15 OSGOOD
HALL L.J. 617 (1977).
139. Advocates of the "conscious parallelism" doctrine argue that collusion without
formal agreement, through, inter alia, price signalling in oligopolistic industries, is a
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of the U.S. negotiating team disagree on the agreement's treatment
of these issues. 140 The Group of 77 will undoubtedly favor a reading
that condemns parallel conduct in oligopolistic industries.141 More-
over, several other members of Group B also appear to favor the
inclusion of the shared monopoly concept.142
The definition of "restrictive business practices" states that such
a market position is "abused" if acts are undertaken that "limit
access to markets or otherwise unduly restrain competition, having
or being likely to have adverse effects on international trade, particu-
larly that of developing countries and on the economic development
of these countries." 43 The specific reference to the trade and devel-
opment of developing countries in the definition admits of three
interpretations: first, culpability may depend on a finding of adverse
effects on the industries of a developing country; second, culpability
may arise for causing a lower degree of harm to developing country
restraint of trade in violation of section one of the Sherman Act. Advocates of the
"shared monopoly" doctrine favor penalizing conduct that is designed to enable mem-
bers in oligopolistic industries to act in unison absent an express agreement (successive
public price announcements, for example).
American supporters of the shared monopoly theory argue that Section 1 of
the Sherman Act is violated when firms in a position of oligopolistic interdepen-
dence, by the use of facilitating mechanisms, coordinate their decisionmaking
and achieve a monopoly-like level of performance without any overt agreement.
They argue that Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also violated when there are
several firms which dominate the market and their behavior appears to be so
concerted that their actions appear to be conducted in furtherance of a single
monopolistic purpose. The type of behavior which would fall within this cate-
gory would be uniform prices, the phenomenon of price leadership, and competi-
tion in consumer industries through product differentiation and advertising.
Translated into simpler terms, the doctrine of shared monopoly condemns oli-
gopolies, per se, as violations of the antitrust laws.
Plaine, International Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices, in PRIVATE INVESTORS
ABROAD 1, 16 (M. Landwehr ed. 1979).
140. See 305 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) (U.S. Export Weekly) C-5 (April 29, 1980)
("there exists some ambiguity on whether the definition includes conscious parallel-
ism."). Cf. Dep't State, Bureau Pub. Affairs, GIST, March, 1981, at 2 (stating that the
Agreed Principles and Rules "avoid[s] . . . the 'shared monopoly' concept").
141. Not content with accepting the unclear doctrine of intraenterprise liability,
the developing countries have also embraced the hitherto untested and unac-
cepted theory of "shared monopoly." They are not deterred by the fact that the
"shared monopoly" theory has not been successfully applied or implemented in
any developed country. In this regard, delegates from the developed countries,
especially the United States, have promoted the shared monopoly concept and
all too willingly encouraged developing country delegates to accept it. They
have agreed with the developing country delegates that the doctrine of shared
monopoly is an accepted part of antitrust law and should be included in an inter-
national code.
Plaine, supra note 139, at 15-16.
142. [1979] 944 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-I I to A-12. The laws of
the European Economic Community and the Federal Republic of Germany attack
shared or joint monopolization. See Davidow, supra note 34, at 591.
143. Agreed Principles and Rules § B(i)(1).
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industry than to industry of a developed country; and third, the stan-
dard for culpability, whether competition is stifled, applies equally to
all state industries harming any other state's industries, with devel-
oping countries specifically mentioned in the standard only by way
of illustration. Group B will argue for the third alternative; the
Group of 77 will probably favor the second.
Section D specifies acts that constitute condemned behavior as
abuses of a dominant position: "predatory behavior towards com-
petitors, such as using below cost pricing to eliminate competitors;"
"discriminatory" or "unjustifiably differentiated" pricing or terms of
sale; mergers and other joint operations "whether of a horizontal,
vertical or a conglomerate nature;" fixing resale prices; restrictions
on the importation of genuine trademark articles where the "purpose
of such restrictions is to maintain artificially high prices;" and vari-
ous other non-price vertical restrictions if employed for purposes
other than "the achievement of legitimate business purposes, such as
quality, safety, adequate distribution or service."' 144 A footnote
states that "[w]hether acts or behavior are abusive or not should be
examined in terms of their purpose and effects in the actual situa-
tion," with consideration given to, inter alia, "special conditions or
economic circumstances in the relevant market."'145
The Agreed Principles and Rules is more lenient on vertical
agreements, discriminatory pricing, and mergers than is U.S. law, if
the UNCRBP terminology is read in light of common American
usage. Under the Robinson-Patman Act, courts may declare dis-
criminatory pricing illegal (unless justified by cost or the need to
answer a rival), even if the actor is not a monopolist; 146 the Agreed
Principles and Rules restricts discriminatory pricing only if engaged
in by a monopolist. The Clayton Act prohibits mergers if they
threaten to undermine the competitive structure of a market;147 the
Agreed Principles and Rules condemns mergers only if the resulting
entity has actual control of a relevant market.148 Vertical restrictions
in the United States may be illegal whether or not undertaken by a
monopolist-resale price restrictions and tying arrangements areper
se illegal, while other nonprice restrictions receive Rule of Reason
treatment. 149 The Agreed Principles and Rules condemns resale
144. Id § D(4).
145. Id § D(4)n.
146. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21a (1976). Arguably, however, a firm lacking market
power has neither the incentive nor the ability to discriminate.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). See generally Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962).
148. Agreed Principles and Rules § D(4).
149. See Continental TN., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1979). See also
Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958) (per se illegality of tying
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price restrictions only if undertaken by a monopolist, 50 and other
nonprice restrictions only if undertaken by a monopolist without a
"legitimate business purpose."'' The predatory behavior prohibi-
tion in the Agreed Principles and Rules, however, is similar to the
prohibition that has developed in United States law, where the
"below cost pricing" definition is much debated. 52
Subsection D(3) lists business "agreements or arrangements"
that are condemned when they "limit access to markets or otherwise
unduly restrain competition."'' 53 The list, which, unlike subsection
D(4), is not exhaustive, includes price-fixing agreements; "collusive
tendering"; market or customer allocations; concerted refusals to
deal; "concerted refusal[s] to supply potential importers"; and "col-
lective denial[s] of access to an arrangement crucial to competi-
tion." 154 The section B definition of "restrictive business practices"
incorporates these prohibitions by reference in the clause "or which
through formal, informal, written or unwritten agreements or
arrangements among enterprises have the same impact."' 55 The
United States negotiators probably intended the term "same impact"
to refer to the earlier clause in the definition "limit access to markets
or otherwise unduly restrain competition."' 56 The language of sub-
section D(3) itself supports this conclusion. Arguably, however, the
term "same impact" could refer to the entire previous restrictive
clause beginning with "which, through an abuse or acquisition and
abuse of a dominant position of market power." If the latter inter-
pretation is correct, the "restrictive business practices" definition
applies only to agreements in which one or more of the participating
firms controls a relevant market. This would be a very permissive
definition, and would create a disparity between the standard states
are asked to implement under sections C and E and the standard
enterprises are asked to obey under section D. The sensible interpre-
tation would be to construe the reference to agreements in the
"restrictive business practices" definition as synonymous with sub-
section D(3).
Subsection D(3) appears basically consistent with United States
law on the practices it condemns. The subsection, however, does not
arrangements); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)
(resale price fixingper se illegal).
150. Agreed Principles and Rules § D(4)(d).
151. Id § D(4)(e).
152. For discussion of the debate, see symposia contained in 87-88 YALE L.J. (1977-
78), and 88-89 HARV. L. REv. (1975-76).
153. Agreed Principles and Rules § D(3).
154. Id § D(4)(e).
155. Id § B(i)().
156. Interviews with Joel Davidow, note 37 supra.
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appear to permit the establishment of conclusive presumptions orper
se rules that are so important to American antitrust jurisprudence.
The subsection condemns only agreements that actually restrain
competition. U.S. law condemns all agreements of selected types,
because of the belief that the substantial majority of such agreements
restrain competition, and that the disadvantage of prohibiting a few
beneficial arrangements is outweighed by the advantages gained in
minimizing enforcement costs.' 5 7 The Agreed Principles and Rules
gives all business agreements scrutiny under some type of Rule of
Reason treatment; all the facts of each case must be gathered and
balanced to judge whether the agreement is anti-competitive.158 The
refusal to useper se rules in the agreement is perhaps unfortunate,
because the Agreed Principles and Rules lacks a binding judicial
enforcement mechanism. 59 The Agreed Principles and Rules would
seem to require, for optimal effectiveness, bright line prohibitions
thatper se rules provide. Definite standards would enable one state
to ascertain more confidently the failure of enterprises or other
states to abide by the standards' prescriptions. The lack of definite
standards invites irreconcilable factual disputes, since there is no for-
mal resolution mechanism. Of course, agreements that are per se
illegal under American law should be highly suspect under the lan-
guage of the Agreed Principles and Rules.
2. Omissions
An analysis of practices the UNCRBP participants agreed not
to condemn is basically an analysis of the primary negotiating tri-
umphs of Group B. The Group of 77 and Group D submitted a
series of proposals in the UNCTAD Groups of Experts that were
aimed not at promoting and preserving competition, but at restrict-
ing the operating freedom of transnational corporations. The Group
of 77 proposed to restrict the use of consignments, trademark and
tradename licensing and "other marketing strategies" that they per-
ceived to limit imports or exports by industry indigenous to Group
157. Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the
social utility of particular commercial practices. The possibility that anticompe-
titive consequences will result from a practice and the severity of those conse-
quences must be balanced against its procompetitive consequences. Cases that
do not fit the generalization may arise, but aperse rule reflects the judgment that
such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and
expenses necessary to identify them.
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1979).
158. Under a Rule of Reason approach, the "fact finder weighs all of the circum-
stances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as impos-
ing an unreasonable restraint on competition." Id at 49. See also Chicago Board of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
159. See notes 198-218 infra and accompanying text.
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of 77 countries.' 60 Both the Group of 77 and Group D sought to
circumscribe intra-enterprise agreements. Group D's text was the
most elaborate:
(v) The specific forms of restrictive business practices employed by transna-
tional corpiorations in order to gain a dominant position of market power
include:
(a) Manipulations with transfer prices;
(b) Schemes for dividing up markets between parent companies and
their subsidiaries in other countries;
(c) Schemes of global strategy under which the headquarters of trans-
national corporations give the enterprises under their control in
other countries directives concerning the volume and inventory or
production, investment policy, sources of procurement of equip-
ment and materials, the levels of purchase prices, outlet channels
for the finished products, the volume and geographical direction of
export and the transfer of profits and capital to other countries.1 6 1
Similarly, the Group of 77 sought to prohibit the "use of pricing
policies for transactions with related enterprises to fix prices and in
particular to overcharge or undercharge for products or services
purchased or supplied." 62
Group B refused to agree to such provisions, saying: first, that
such matters were not germane to an antitrust code-transfer pric-
ing, for example, is considered a financial or tax revenue problem
rather than a restrictive business practice; second, that the provisions
could not be practically followed because of their vagueness; and
third, that the provisions could discourage foreign investment. 63
The apparent success of the Group B negotiators in blunting the
Group of 77 demands for including general regulatory provisions in
the Agreed Principles and Rules is remarkable in light of the fervor
with which the Group of 77 pursues New Order principles. Perhaps
this success is attributable to Group B's internally cohesive negotiat-
ing package; the rigor and definiteness of that package may have
enabled it to dominate the discussion with principled and reasoned
positions on difficult issues. The more elusive social and political
goals of the Group of 77, although powerful concepts, may have
fallen under the mechanistic ax of economic logic.' 64 It is folly to
160. Report of the Third AdHoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices
on its Sixth Session, supra note 34, at 20-21.
161. Id at 9-10.
162. Id at 21.
163. See Report of the Third AdHoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Prac-
tices on its Fourth Session, supra note 31, at 15-16; Davidow, supra note 34, at 599-600.
164. Daniel Plaine has stated that "[t]here is a hard economic realism which would
very likely inject some pragmatism into the present debate about intracorporate restric-
tions and, it is hoped, result in a sensible compromise. Plaine, supra note 139, at 15.
An alternative explanation may be that the New Order itself exhibits a yet unclarified
tension between the principles of economic planning and free trade. See Fatouros, supra
note 45, at 101. Some New Order demands reflect an effort to allocate world resources
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believe, however, that the Group of 77 and Group D, in consenting
to a code without such provisions, have dropped their demands for
regulations consistent with their early draft provisions. They may
either have decided to press these demands in an alternate forum,
such as the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corpora-
tions,165 or, more likely, to assert that the theory of their specific pro-
posals has been incorporated in some of the more general provisions
of the Agreed Principles and Rules. 166
The most sensitive issue in this area is the propriety of "transfer
pricing." Transfer prices are prices set on intra-company transfers to
maximize the global profits of the parent corporation. 167 When
transnational corporations buy from and sell to their own subsidiar-
ies, they establish prices that often have little connection to the mar-
ket price. The deviations from the market price depend on a variety
of factors: minimizing tax burdens; taking advantage of foreign cur-
rency exchange rates; maximizing repatriation profits; and the need
for public relations leverage in dealing with stockholders or public
authorities.168 The literature on how to manage transnational corpo-
rations is filled with advice on how to set prices on intra-company
transfers.169 Current international trade conditions encourage trans-
national corporations to overvalue imports and undervalue exports
when dealing with a subsidiary in a developing country.170 Thus, the
developing countries are disadvantaged in foreign exchange matters
on the basis of political principles; other demands reflect an assumption of world-wide
free trade. Id. The tension has created some confusion and oscillation in Group of 77
negotiating positions.
165. When a representative of the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corpora-
tions, the Secretariat to the Commission on Transnational Corporations, reported before
the Third AdHoc Group of Experts, he was closely questioned by Group B representa-
tives on whether the Centre was investigating the issue of transfer pricing. Report of the
Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practice on its Fifth Session,
supra note 32, at 6. Group B consistently attempted to refer transfer pricing issues to the
Commission on Transnational Corporations. Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group of
Experts on Restrictive Business Practices on its Fourth Session, supra note 31, at 15.
Ironically, the negotiators at the Commission have apparently dropped the issue as too
sensitive politically for an agreement.
166. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 192-97 infra.
167. R. BARNETT & R. MILLER, supra note 51, at 157.
168. See generally R. VERNON & L. WELLS, JR., ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT OF INTER-
NATIONAL BUSINESS ch. 3 (2d ed. 1976).
169. See, e.g., id; M. BROOKE & H. REMMERS, THE STRATEGY OF MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE (1970); J. STOPFORD & L. WELLS, JR., MANAGING THE MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE (1972).
170. R. BARNETT & R. MILLER, supra note 51, at 173-76. On the other hand, transna-
tional enterprises also can gain, under appropriate circumstances, from underpricing
imports to their subsidiaries. This lessens customs duty payments and enables the com-
pany's subsidiary to engage in predatory pricing behavior in order to obtain local market
dominance. See generally Greenhill & Herbolzheimer, International Transfer Pricing:
The Restrictive Business Practices Approach, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 232 (1980).
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and tax collection,17I and perceive they are losing wealth to home
countries due to the diversion of profits attributable to local resource
exploitation. As noted by a Group D spokesman, control of intra-
corporate transactions is therefore a fundamental New Order
tenet.' 72
Whether the issue of transfer pricing has been eliminated from
the Agreed Principles and Rules may turn on the interpretation of
subsection D(4)(b) on discriminatory pricing. The provision con-
demns "discriminatory" or "unjustifiably differentiated" prices "in
transactions between affiliated enterprises which overcharge or
undercharge for goods or services purchased or supplied as com-
pared with prices for similar or comparable transactions outside the
affiliated enterprises."' 173 The clause is similar to the Group of 77
proposal noted earlier and, standing alone, appears to regulate trans-
fer pricing if such pricing affects the market.' 74 The difference from
the earlier Group of 77 proposal, however, lies in the subordination
of the transfer pricing restriction to language that condemns only
behavior limiting access to markets or otherwise unduly restraining
competition.' 75 Since transfer prices theoretically never adversely
affect competition unless they are vehicles for predatory pricing,' 76
this limitation effectively nullifies the transfer pricing restriction.
Indeed, the provision is redundant in light of an earlier subsection
condemning predatory behavior.' 77 The inclusion of the provision
suggests that some or all of the negotiators have misunderstood the
scope of its content. One wonders whether it is a prohibition against
"price squeezes."' 78
The dispute over the use of transnational marketing strategies,
particularly those that include affiliate cooperation, to hinder
imports or exports by related enterprises is reflected in subsection
B(4)(e). The attack on marketing strategies by Group D and the
171. Id
172. E.g., Report of the Third AdHoe Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Prac-
tices on its Sixth Session, supra note 34, at 40-41 (Group D spokesman).
173. Agreed Principles and Rules § D(4)(b). See Greenhill & Herbolzheimer, supra
note 170, at 240-41.
174. See Report of the ThirdAdHoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Prac-
tices on its Sixth Session, supra note 31, at 40-41.
175. The text is based, therefore, on the OECD Guidelines. See note 81 supra.
176. But cf. Trans World Airlines v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973) (tying arrangements by parent to affiliate may be actionable
at behest of minority stockhholders).
177. See notes 135-38 supra and accompanying text.
178. A price squeeze occurs when a partially integrated monopolist raises the price of
a raw material to customers while maintaining the price of the final product it sells in
competition with those same customers. See III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 79,
at I 728C; R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 243-244 (1978). A provision prohibiting
price squeezes is subject to serious question. Id
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Group of 77 constitutes the high water mark of their efforts to inject
general investment and development issues into the Agreed Princi-
ples and Rules. 179 Group B agreed to condemn, based on precedents
in the OECD countries, 180 the use by dominant firms of licensed or
assigned trademarks to prevent the parallel importation of products
legitimately bearing the same mark, if the purpose of the practice is
to avoid competition from such imports rather than to protect buyers
from confusion. 18' The provision includes trademark arrangements
between affiliated companies. 18 2 Otherwise, Group B prevailed in its
desire not to proscribe parent-subsidiary transactions involving mar-
keting strategies. 183
The final noteworthy omission in the Agreed Principles and
Rules is the absence of regulations on technology licensing. The
First Ad Hoc Group of Experts recommended that certain restric-
tions in the area of technology licenses be declared illegitimate. 184
But subsequent Groups of Experts on restrictive trade practices left
the regulation of technology licensing to the UNCTAD Committee
on Transfer of Technology. 185 The Code on Transfer of Technology,
designed to improve the economic position of developing countries,
has origins independent from the Agreed Principles and Rules. 186
Although four diplomatic level conferences on the transfer of tech-
nology had produced agreement on about seventy percent of a text
179. See Davidow, supra note 5, at 37.
180. See generally OECD, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES RELATING TO TRADE-
MARKS (1978).
181. Agreed Principles and Rules § D(4)(e).
182. A similar restriction exists in American law. See 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1976); 19
C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(2) (1980); United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y.
1957), judgment vacated, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), action dismissed, 172 F. Supp. 107
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). See also U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTER-
NATIONAL OPERATIONS, Case F nn. 65-66 (1977). The Guerlain reasoning is question-
able, however. The Guerlain restriction is, in essence, an effort to forestall international
price discrimination by affiliated entities selling trademarked goods. Price discrimination
should be prohibited only in those rare instances in which it is used to engage in preda-
tory pricing.
183. The Group B countries were not even forced to carry through on their willingness
to adopt the position argued by the United States government in United States v. Everest
& Jenneys Int'l, C.A. No. 77-1648R (C.D. Cal. 1977), [1979]-1 CCH TRADE CAS.
62508, at 76,961 (1979). See Davidow, supra note 5, at 36-37.
184. Report of the First AdHoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices,
supra note 31, at 3-6.
185. See, e.g., Report of The Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Busi-
ness Practices, supra note 31, at 21.
186. See An International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc.
TD/B/C.6/AC.1/2/Supp. 1/rev. 1, para. 3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Code on Transfer
of Technology]. A 1974 UNCTAD resolution called for the negotiation of such a code.
Report of the Intergovernmental Group on Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/B/
520 (1974). A Group of Experts met in May 1975, but no common draft emerged. See
Code on Transfer of Technology supra, paras. 3 & 5. Nonetheless, in 1977, the matter
was pushed to diplomatic conference. See Davidow, supra note 5, at 16-17.
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on restrictive licensing, the negotiations now appear indefinitely
stalemated. 8 7
In the transfer of technology conferences, Group B has argued
that industrial property rights in patents, trade-secrets and other con-
fidential business information deserve protection and should be spe-
cially exempted from restrictive business practice laws.188 According
to Group B, a licensor of confidential technology should be free to
set price, quantity, field of use, territorial and other conditions in
licenses, as long as the licensor does not abuse its rights to the tech-
nology.'8 9 The Group of 77, however, is largely unwilling to allow
owners of technology to use any form of restrictive license. Rather,
the Group of 77 insists that licensors be required to license the tech-
nology without accompanying provisos on price, quantity, and other
conditions. 90
The division of labor between the Agreed Principles and Rules
and the Code on Transfer of Technology' 91 does not mean that
licensing restrictions are necessarily outside the scope of the Agreed
Principles and Rules. The United States antitrust laws have been
held to justify prosecutions for various "abuses" of industrial prop-
erty rights. 92 The Group of 77 is on solid ground, therefore, in
arguing that, at minimum, the language of the Agreed Principles and
Rules also regulates those "abuses.' 93
187. See id
188. See generally Davidow, United States Antitrust Laws and International Transfer of
Technology: The Government View, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 733 (1975). Cf. Finnegan, The
Burgeoning Development of the Common Market Competition Rules and Its Impact on
International Licensing, 27 MERCER L. REV. 519 (1976) (industrial property rights under
antitrust laws of European Economic Community).
189. Abuses of industrial property rights in Group B countries include versions of the
following: licensing obligations that extend beyond the life of the rights; that prevent
licensee challenges on the validity of the rights; that prevent licensee research into new
products or processes; that require grant backs of select privileges from licensees; that tie
technology to the purchase of additional technology, goods or services; that decide terri-
tories through cross-licensing; and that act to restrain competition by facilitating the
pooling of such rights. See Preparation of a Draft Outline of an International Code of
Conduct on Transfer of Technology, Submitted on Behalf of Experts from Group B,
U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.I/L.2 (1975), as revised by U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.I/L.5
(1975), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 473 (1978); Davidow, supra note 5, at 40-
44. See also Joelson, United States Law and the Proposed Code of Conduct on the Trans-
fer of Technology, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 835 (1978).
190. E.g., Preparation of a Draft Outline of an International Code of conduct on
Transfer of Technology, Submitted on Behalf of the Group of 77, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/
L.l/Rev.1 (1975), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 462 (1978).
191. See note 186 supra.
192. See note 189 supra.
193. An official of the United States Justice Department, Antitrust Division recently
commented:
A recently adopted United Nations voluntary "Set of Multilaterally Agreed
Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices"
contains no rules dealing expressly with know-how licensing. However, the rules
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Moreover, because the balance struck by Group B countries
between the scope of industrial property rights and antitrust laws is
not incorporated specifically in the Agreed Principles and Rules, the
Group of 77 could argue that the language supports a less lenient
balance. There is an inherent tension between the recognition of
industrial property rights and the tenets of competition. Industrial
property rights are, in essence, governmental grants of legal monop-
olies over the fruits of select technologies.1 94 The grants encourage
the development, use and disclosure of progressive innovations. 195
The scope of the grants reflects a judgment on the best balance
between the gains from incentives to innovators and the costs from
permitting private monopolies over valuable information. Group B
countries give broad protection to the grants. The Group of 77, bas-
ing their arguments, arguendo, on the Group B objective of encour-
aging competition (rather than New Order principles) could
construct a strong argument, with support from United States schol-
ars, 196 that United States law is too lenient and, accordingly, that the
language of the Agreed Principles and Rules requires restrictions on
technology licensing beyond those recognized in U.S. law. 197 For
example, developing countries could argue credibly that restrictions
(particularly price and export restrictions) in licensing agreements
with actual or potential rivals restrain competition in violation of the
various prohibitions of subsection D(3). The failure of the Agreed
Principles and Rules to address specially the licensing problem may,
therefore, result in the wholesale incorporation of the transfer of
technology code debate, and stalemate, into the Agreed Principles
and Rules.
3. Mechanisms for On-Going Interpretation
In sum, the Agreed Principles and Rules contains numerous
terms with elusive meanings: "acting together," "control the rele-
vant market," "limit access to markets," "unduly restrain competi-
tion," "unjustifiable," "legitimate business purposes," and so forth.
Such terms leave much room for philosophic differences and for dif-
are universally applicable to all transactions in goods and services, and one
would suppose that some or even most know-how transfers involve goods or
could be characterized as being a sale of services.
J. Davidow, Antitrust and International Know-How Licensing, Remarks to Vanderbilt
University Symposium on Transnational Technology Transfer (1980) (copy on file at
Cornell International Law Journal).
194. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE 440-43 (2d ed. 1980); L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 137, at 176-77.
195. F. SCHERER, supra note 194, at 440-41.
196. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, supra note 137, at 184.
197. Burbaum, Restrictions Inherent in the Patent Monopoly- A Comparative Critique,
113 U. PA. L. REv. 663 (1965).
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ferences in factual interpretation, much as the term "competition" in
American antitrust law shelters disparate American political philoso-
phies.198 A comparison of the populist and darwinist positions illus-
trates the latitude of the term in American law. Populists define
competition as the state of affairs that results from an industry com-
posed of small, independently-owned businesses. 199 Competition is
viewed as a system of decentralized economic and governmental
power that maximizes individual freedom. Social darwinists, how-
ever, define competition as the state of affairs that encourages supe-
rior businesses to survive and grow. 20 0 Successful businesses are
presumed to make better products at lower cost, and growth is a
reward for their vigor. Populists attempt to prevent private concen-
trations of economic power; darwinists are apologists for such power.
Both the populists and darwinists have enjoyed some success,
although the darwinists are currently more influential.20' The fed-
eral judiciary and the Federal Trade Commission are trusted to rec-
oncile these and other diverse positions on the aims of antitrust
enforcement.20 2 A somewhat analogous political dichotomy existed
at the UNCRBP. The Group of 77 and Group D countries seek to
protect national enterprises from international corporations. Group
B countries seek to promote efficient competition in international
trade. These divergent goals will inevitably lead the Groups to inter-
pret the critical terms of the Agreed Principles and Rules differently.
The use of general terminology in other antitrust codes, such as
sections 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty or sections one and two of the
Sherman Act,20 3 apparently has lulled the UNCRBP participants
198. Professor Bork has identified five different meanings of the term "competition" in
the case law. R. BORK, supra note 178, at 58-61. See also Bernhard, Divergent Concepts
of Competition in Antitrust Cases, 15 ANTITRUST BULL. 43 (1970). Professor Bernhard
states that the term represents a "chaotic and conflicting array of concepts, notions and
formulas." Bernhard, Competition in Law and Economics, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1099
(1967).
199. Id
200. See generally Pitofsky, The Political Content ofAntitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051
(1979).
201. For a triumph of populism, see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416, 417 (2d Cir. 1945), where Judge Learned Hand found in the Sherman Act a
preference for "a system of small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own
skill and character," over "one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept the
direction of a few." On the other hand, recent Supreme Court decisions stress that con-
siderations of economic efficiency dominate American antitrust analysis. E.g., National
Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978); Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-56 (1973). See also I P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 79, 104.
202. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 178, at 118-19; F. SCHERER, supra note 194, at 38.
203. For a discussion of the United States and Common Market antitrust laws, see B.
HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST (1979).
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into the use of similarly vague language. 2°4 These other codes, how-
ever, are implemented by enforcement mechanisms that provide a
degree of cohesion to, and reconciliation of, diverse views on inter-
pretation. The Sherman Act, for example, is more the enactment of
a legal process than the enactment of a set of business practice rules.
Congress deferred to the federal courts for the development of an
American antitrust law, recognizing that these courts will use reason-
ing characteristic of common law courts in carrying out their man-
date.205 The Commission of European Communities, the Court of
Justice, and member state tribunals provide an analogous function in
interpreting and enforcing the Rome Treaty.20 6 Group B insisted
that the UNCRBP use general standards and rely on a "case-by-
case" definition of such standards. But the UNCRBP, again at the
seemingly incongruous insistence of Group B, did not establish or
otherwise provide a case decision mechanism. Rather, the Agreed
Principles and Rules establishes only the Intergovernmental Group
as a source of official interpretation, and its value in this regard is
highly speculative.20 7
The Intergovernmental Group is designed to provide a forum
for multilateral consultation on the operation of the Agreed Princi-
ples and Rules; to invite, undertake and circulate studies on restric-
tive business practices; to request, if needed, relevant data from
states; to collect and circulate information on the efforts undertaken
by states to comply with the Agreed Principles and Rules; to make
reports and recommendations to states on the application and imple-
mentation of the Agreed Principles and Rules; and to submit yearly
204. See Report of the Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business
Practices, supra note 31, at 11-12.
205. The often-quoted statement of Senator Sherman is the most important evidence
of the intentions of the Fifty-first Congress in enacting the Sherman Abt:
I admit that it is difficult to define in legal language the precise line between
lawful and unlawful combinations. This must be left for the courts to determine
in each particular case. All that we, as lawmakers, can do is to declare general
principles, and we can be assured that the courts will apply them so as to carry
out the meaning of the law, as the courts of England and the United States have
done for centuries.
21 CONG. REc. 2460 (1890). As one might expect, the courts tend to quote this statement
whenever they need to justify uncomfortable extensions of relevant antitrust precedent.
See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 483 U.S. 422, 438 n.14 (1978).
206. See B. HAWK, supra note 203, at 415-27. Hawk asserts that there is greater clarity
in EEC competition policy than in its U.S. counterpart because of the simpler structure
of the EEC enforcement mechanism.
207. See notes 210-14 infra and accompanying text. Perhaps the Group B position
was designed to weaken appreciably the strength of any UNCRBP agreement. If so, the
strategy appears to have been successful.
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reports.208 Section G, however, contains the following caveat:
In the performance of its functions, neither the Intergovernmental Group nor
its subsidiary organs shall act like a tribunal or otherwise pass judgment on
the activities or conduct of individual Governments or of individual enter-
prises in connexion with a specific business transaction. The Intergovern-
mental Group or its subsidiary organs should avoid becoming involved when
enterprises to a specific business transaction are in dispute.20 9
The line between making recommendations to states on the applica-
tion and implementation of the Agreed Principles and Rules and
passing judgment on the activities of states is a fine one. Presuma-
bly, generally and affirmatively phrased recommendations will avoid
the restriction.
The critical import of the section is the ability of the Intergov-
ernmental Group to use its reports and recommendations to dissemi-
nate interpretations of contested provisions. Although the precise
constitution of the Intergovernmental Group is unspecified, the
Agreed Principles and Rules calls for the Group to operate as an
adjunct to an UNCTAD committee. Because such bodies are histor-
ically open to all UNCTAD members, 210 Group B, Group D and the
Group of 77 should all have representatives in the Intergovernmen-
tal Group. Moreover, other UNCTAD committees historically have
emphasized the quest for consensus and have de-emphasized vot-
ing.211 If a consensus emerges from "contact group" meetings, the
common position is put before a plenary session to become official
policy. If no consensus emerges, the issue is either left for future
resolution or each side makes a public statement of its own posi-
tion.212 The Intergovemrmental Group will undoubtedly operate
similarly.
The Group will perform optimally if it does not take advantage
of its option to let disputed issues pass without public comment. The
public airing of conflicting positions exerts a subtle pressure towards
reasonableness that may encourage unanimity. Moreover, an ongo-
ing chronicle of conflicts, as well as agreements, on the meaning of
the Agreed Principles and Rules' language would provide an evolv-
ing clarification of the real content of the underlying compact. Since
the Group must issue a yearly report on its work, it might use the
208. See Agreed Principles and Rules § G. The Intergovernmental Group is also to
submit proposals to a second UNCRBP to be held five years after the adoption of the
Agreed Principles and Rules. Id § G(iii).
209. Id § G(ii)(4).
210. See U.N. DEP'T PUB. INFO., EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS, supra note 31, at
140.
211. See Cordovey, UNCTAD and Development Diplomacy: From Confrontation to
Strategy, 6 J. WORLD TRADE L. 62 (1972).
212. R. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 39, at 195.
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report as a vehicle for such a chronicle.213 If a chronicle of agree-
ments is published periodically, Group negotiations could build on
earlier successful negotiations, and affected parties could better
assess the extent of their obligations under the document.
Those interpretations by the Group that do represent a consen-
sus will have an official air and will represent a collective commit-
ment that should lead UNCRBP members to accord them respect.
Of course, disputes over the meaning of provisions in the Agreed
Principles and Rules that require the attention of the Intergovern-
mental Group may be reflected in the deliberations of the Group
itself, with the result that no consensus on and, therefore, no defini-
tive interpretation of disputed language will ever emerge. The hope
of the Agreed Principles and Rules negotiators, particularly those
from Group B, is that general ideological conflicts will not prevent
consensus when specific issues are addressed pragmatically. The rig-
orous demands of formulating arguments of reasoned particularity,
coupled with the superior expertise of officials from Group B coun-
tries (where most of the antitrust legislation extant in the world
exists) appear to support the optimism of the Group B negotiators. 21 4
The success of the UNCRBP itself also provides some basis for such
a prediction.
The Agreed Principles and Rules also provides for a limited
bilateral consultation procedure that could provide additional,
though limited, interpretation through negotiation:
[W]here a State, particularly of a developing country, believes that a consul-
tation with another State or States is appropriate in regard to an issue con-
cerning control of restrictive business practices, it may request a consultation
with those States with a view to finding a mutually acceptable solution...
States should accord full consideration to requests for consultations and
upon agreement as to the subject of and the procedures for such a consulta-
tion, the consultation should take place at an appropriate time.
2 15
As is evident from the language of the subsection, the procedure is
voluntary. The Group of 77 proposed that the UNCTAD Trade and
Development Board have the authority to resolve issues that could
not be resolved in bilateral conferences, but Group B countries suc-
cessfully opposed the provision.216 The Agreed Principles and Rules
provides only that the UNCTAD Secretariat, if the parties involved
so permit, may issue a report on the results of a consultation. These
213. Since 1972, the EEC Commission has issued annual reports on competition pol-
icy. These reports describe the Commission's approach to specific issues, thereby guiding
industries and member states on the meaning of the Rome Treaty. See B. HAwK, supra
note 203, at 424-26.
214. Interviews with Joel Davidow, note 37 supra.
215. Agreed Principles and Rules §§ F(4)(a)-F(4)(b).
216. See Report of the Third4dHoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Prac-
tices on its Fourth Session, supra note 40, Annex I.
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consultations may involve the appropriateness of state action or
inaction in light of the standards of the Agreed Principles and Rules.
If so, the reports, if circulated, could serve to clarify areas of agree-
ment and disagreement in the interpretation of the compact. Only a
few member states typically will be parties to the proceedings, how-
ever, and the reports will have limited persuasiveness for those states
not directly involved.
The consultation procedure is similar to one contained in the
1976 OECD Guidelines and to the one contained in the GATT.21 7
The history of these provisions suggests that states are more likely to
use consultation procedures to complain about ongoing foreign anti-
trust investigations or prosecutions than to demand relief from
anticompetitive business conduct through the enforcement organs of
a foreign state.218
The impotence of the Intergovernmental Group and the consul-
tation mechanism may lead some to argue that the Agreed Principles
and Rules should be interpreted by analogy to similar provisos in the
Rome Treaty or the Sherman Act.21 9 There is no solid evidence that
either the UNCTAD Groups of Experts or the UNCRBP partici-
pants intended such an approach. Indeed, circumstantial evidence
suggests the opposite. The language of the Agreed Principles and
Rules is unique; its cardinal standards do not follow exactly the lan-
guage of any other antitrust code. Moreover, the Agreed Principles
and Rules repeatedly refers to a policy not incorporated into existing
antitrust codes (most of which are promulgated by developed coun-
tries)-the social needs and political demands of developing coun-
tries vis-a-vis developed countries. This lack of similarity in text and
purpose diminishes the force of analogical interpretation.
In sum, unless the Intergovernmental Group is successful in rec-
onciling diverse interpretations, the Agreed Principles and Rules
papers over too many disagreements for the document to qualify as
an operable consensus on international restrictive business practice
problems. Developing countries will argue for implied exemptions
for their industries and for broad application of rules to transna-
tional industries. Developed countries will argue for narrow appli-
217. Interviews with Joel Davidow, note 37 supra.
218. See Davidow, supra note 5, at 53. Interestingly, "restrictive business practices"
consultation clauses have been included in treaties of friendship, commerce and naviga-
tion between the United States and foreign countries (usually developed countries) for
over thirty years. Implementation of the clauses has been rare. See B. HAWK, supra note
203, at 813; Haight, The Restrictive Business Practices Clause in United States Treaties.- An
Antitrust Tranquilizer/or International Trade, 70 YALE L.J. 240 (1960).
219. The abuse of dominant position language, for example, found in § D(4) of the
Agreed Principles and Rules, is similar to language found in article 86 of the Treaty of
Rome. See B. Hawk, supra note 203, at 680.
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cation of the restrictions, based on economic principles of allocative
efficiency. A transnational enterprise will have to stay abreast of
each state's restrictive business practice standards in order to comply
with these shadowy restrictions. Part of the task will be to ascertain
how each state is using the UNCRBP agreement. In other words,
the enterprises will have the burden of assessing a variety of state
standards, a burden they had before the agreement, complicated by
the burden of speculating on the effect of the agreement in each
jurisdiction.
B. STATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER AGREED PRINCIPLES AND RULES
1. Domestic Legislation
Should states agree to follow the directions of the UNCRBP
compact, what are their obligations? Sections E and F ask that states
perform specified acts to implement the restrictive business practice
standards identified in the earlier sections. Although the obligations
are stated briefly and concisely, their generality will cause a state
seeking in good faith to follow them to be, at best, perplexed on
exactly what it should do. Moreover, the generality of the provisions
will cause states to interpret the provisions in light of their individual
predispositions on the subject. Indeed, UNCRBP participants
already appear to have developed a variety of interpretations on
their obligations under the agreement.
Subsection E(l) urges that states "adopt, improve and effec-
tively enforce appropriate legislation and implementing judicial and
administrative procedures for the control of restrictive business prac-
tices. ' '220 This subsection raises two questions: first, should a state
adopt legislation opening its courts to suits against its nationals
based on injury having an impact outside its territory; second,
should the legislation contain standards of enterprise behavior that
mimic those in the compact? Subsection E(2) seemingly limits, with-
out explanation, subsection E(l), by urging states to "base their legis-
lation primarily on the principle" of dealing with acts that "limit
access to markets or otherwise unduly restrain competition, having
or being likely to have adverse effects on their trade or economic
development."' 22' The subsection thus recommends that states deal
only with acts that have adverse effects within their own borders.
Moreover, the word "primarily" in the subsection suggests that states
are free to deviate somewhat from the standards of the Agreed Prin-
ciples and Rules in their domestic legislation.
220. Agreed Principles and Rules § E(l).
221. Id § E(2) (emphasis added).
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Subsection E(4), however, reopens one of the issues that subsec-
tion E(2) would appear to have resolved. Subsection E(4) obliges
states to "seek appropriate remedial or preventive measures to pre-
vent and/or control the use of restrictive business practices within
their competence . . . that . . . adversely affect international trade
and particularly the trade and development of the developing coun-
tries.122 2 Under this subsection, are states to enforce the standards of
the compact against their nationals on the basis of extra-territorial
injury? No country has such legislation currently in force. The
United States antitrust laws do not apply to foreign activities that
have no direct or intended effect on domestic commerce.2 23 Neither
does European Community law apply to restraints on exports not
affecting the Community.224 Moreover, statements of Group B rep-
resentatives make clear that their governments will not feel obligated
under the Agreed Principles and Rules to enact such legislation.
Representatives of American business have indicated that their sup-
port for the Agreed Principles and Rules depends on their under-
standing that the code does not require American courts to police
American industry abroad.225 It seems apparent from the drafting
history of the Agreed Principles and Rules, however, that the Group
of 77 believes developed countries have such an obligation,226 and
the Group of 77 may have the better argument under the language of
the agreement.
Group B has two arguments to buttress its interpretation of sub-
section E(4). First, Group B will undoubtedly argue that extraterri-
torial regulation of corporations is not "within their competence," as
that language appears in subsection E(4). International law, how-
ever, recognizes that a state can regulate the conduct of its nationals
wherever they may be or wherever they do business.22 7 Theoreti-
cally, therefore, developed countries could regulate the practices of
their corporations, whether or not such practices affect domestic
commerce. Such legislation is within their legal competence. In
essence, the Group B position is an argument that the phrase reters
to practical as well as legal constraints, and that the practical difficul-?
ties that would attend such expansive jurisdiction (e.g., foreign and
domestic sensitivity; access to information; conflicting decisions) are
222. Id § E(4) (emphasis added).
223. Davidow & Chiles, supra note 16, at 259.
224. B. HAWK, supra note 203, at 583.
225. See Letter of John L. Caldwell, supra note 17, at 2.
226. See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text.
227. E.g., 2 D. P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 602 (2d ed. 1970); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 26, 27, 30
(1965).
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prohibitive.228 Second, Group B can argue that the reference to
"appropriate remedial or preventive measures" in subsection E(4)
refers only to action undertaken pursuant to legislation enacted
under subsection E(2), legislation dealing with domestic effects only.
The Group of 77's rebuttal is that "measures" is a broader, not nar-
rower, term than the concept of legislative action; appropriate legis-
lation is such a "measure," along with administrative and other types
of government actions. The debate promises to be lively.
Returning to subsection E(2), a state confronts the problem of
how closely its legislation should follow standards in the compact.
What does it mean to "primarily" base legislation on the principle of
dealing with undue restraints on competition?229 U.S. statutes are
broader than the standards in the code, but the statutes seemingly
satisfy the criteria of subsection E(2). The agreement, therefore,
does not appear to require the United States to adopt additional
antitrust legislation. The restrictive business practice laws of most
Western nations also appear sufficiently close to the code standards
to satisfy the subsection.
Conversely, the Group of 77 apparently believes that the sub-
section does not limit the group's right to encourage the enactment in
all developing countries of a very broad model law. A separate
UNCTAD document entitled "A Model Antitrust Law for Develop-
ing Countries," written by the UNCTAD Secretariat with the help of
a few select experts from constituent countries of the Group of 77,
goes far beyond the restrictions contained in the Agreed Principles
and Rules.230 The Model Law condemns a wide variety of business
agreements, contains stringent prohibitions on price discrimination,
transfer and excessive pricing, and limits the internal growth of
dominant firms. Experts from Group B countries have vigorously
228. For a discussion of the difficulties, see Davidow & Chiles, supra note 16, at 259-
61.
229. Subsection E(2) does not specifically incorporate the standards of sections B and
D. Subsection E(2) asks states to enact legislation concerned with adverse effects on
"their trade or economic development." Agreed Principles and Rules § E(2) (emphasis
added). Sections B and D define condemned practices by reference to practices that have
"adverse effects on international trade." Accordingly, subsection E(2), if it is to have any
specific definition in the code, must take standards from sections B and D by analogy.
Because practices specified in sections B and D will also have adverse effects on domestic
trade, national legislation enacted pursuant to subsection E(2) should, in effect, strike the
"international effects" language in sections B and D and, in lieu thereof, insert language
of "domestic effect."
230. Model Antitrust Law for Developing Countries, note 66 supra. See Note,
UNCTAD: Model Law on Restrictive Business Practices, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 444
(1980).
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criticized the Model Law.2 3 1 The Group of 77 argues that Group B
has no claim for participation in the drafting of a model law
intended specifically for the developing countries' constituency.2
32
The Group of 77 apparently views the Agreed Principles and Rules
as outlining the minimum obligation of nations with respect to anti-
trust proscriptions, and believes that nations should feel free to aug-
ment significantly its provisions.
Next, the well-meaning state seeking to implement the
UNCRBP agreement must confront the ambiguity in the Agreed
Principles and Rules as to whether to accord special status to the
industries of developing countries. The Group of 77 countries will
no doubt emphasize the language in the Agreed Principles and Rules
that recognizes the special needs of industries of the developing
nations. Subsection C(iii)(7) contains the most cogent declaration of
the policy:
In order to ensure the equitable application of the Set of Principles and
Rules, States, particularly of developed countries, should take into account in
their control of restrictive business practices the development, financial and
trade needs of developing countries, in particular the least developed coun-
tries, for the purposes especially of developing countries in:
(a) promoting the establishment or development of domestic industries and
the economic development of other sectors of the economy; and
(b) encouraging their economic development through regional or global
arrangements among developing countries.
233
This policy of preferential treatment for developing countries is a
wildcard, reminiscent of Justice Brandeis's attempt to protect "small
dealers and worthy men" under the Sherman Act.234 Integrating the
social needs of developing countries into concepts of economic effi-
ciency requires difficult judgments on matters of considerable uncer-
tainty. Are all cartels of industries in developing countries to be
exempt from the Agreed Principles and Rules standards? If not,
which ones are exempt?
In sharp contrast to subsection C(iii)(7), subsection E(3) directs
states to enact restrictive business practices legislation that ensures
"treatment of enterprises which is fair, equitable, on the same basis
to all enterprises, and in accordance with established procedures of
law."' 235 Group B countries will argue forcefully for a broad and
undeviating application of the provision. American business organi-
zations that support the Agreed Principles and Rules carefully note
231. See, e.g., Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business
Practices on its Sixth Session, supra note 34, at 49-53, 56-57. See also Note, supra note
230, at 447-48.
232. See Davidow, supra note 34, at 604.
233. Agreed Principles and Rules § C(iii)(7).
234. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238, 238-39, 241 (1918).
235. Agreed Principles and Rules § E(3).
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and applaud the provision in their letters of approval.236 Yet, any
protection for domestic industries in developing countries or for
developing country cartels per subsection C(iii)(7) would seem to
offend this subsection. Group B countries will argue that they are
prepared to impose fewer antitrust burdens on the industries of
developing counties, but that fewer burdens should be attributable to
those industries' lack of size and market power, not to the economic
condition of their home countries. 237 A "fair" code, according to
Group B, is based on a neutral economic standard applicable to all
global businesses. In rebuttal, the Group of 77 and Group D will
justify as "fair" and "equitable" under New Order principles the
preferential treatment of developing country industries. The Soviet
Union representative, for example, noted at the conclusion of the
UNCRBP that his government supported the grant of "specific privi-
leges" to developing countries under the Agreed Principles and
Rules.238 Each view finds support in the language of the Agreed
Principles and Rules, and it would be unwise for Group B countries
to believe that the Group of 77 and Group D countries allow the
Agreed Principles and Rules to rest solely on principles of economic
efficiency.239
Finally, a well-meaning state finds no guidance on the types of
remedies that are appropriate for violations of national codes
enacted pursuant to subsections E(l) and E(2). The fashioning of
appropriate remedies is critical to the effectiveness of international
or national codes. International unanimity on standards for conduct
means little when there is disharmony concerning sanctions. A large
236. See, e.g., Policy Statement of National Foreign Trade Council, The Restrictive
Business Practices Code (July 21, 1980); Letter from L. Fox, Vice President and Man-
ager, National Association of Manufacturers, International Economic Affairs Depart-
ment, to R. Cooper (July 1, 1980); United States Council of International Chamber of
Commerce, Report of the Committee on Restrictive Business Practices, at 2 (May 24,
1980) (copies of documents on file at Cornell International Law Journal).
237. See UNCRBP Closing Statements, supra note 39, at 7 (closing statement made
by Canada on behalf of Group B). In this regard, it is interesting to note what became of
the Group of 77 support for diplomatic conferences on a code for the transfer of technol-
ogy. Davidow, supra note 5, at 18.
A final irony of the transfer of technology negotiation has been that G-77
nations, particularly of Latin America, who issued the code to universalize their
stringent national laws, came to realize that lengthy bargaining with developed
country experts was resulting in an exception-ridden document which would
more tend to undermine their harsh rules than endorse them.
Id
238. See UNCRBP Closing Statements, supra note 39, at 9 (closing statement made
by the representative of the USSR on behalf of Group D).
239. In the closing statements, only the Group B representative mentioned the concept
of competition. Id at 7. The Secretary-General of UNCTAD, Mr. Gamani Corea, and
China specifically noted that the Agreed Principles and Rules was an important contri-
bution in implementing New Order principles. Id at 7, 9.
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measure of current international tension over restrictive business
practices stems from divergent national positions on appropriate
remedies. For example, substantial international friction is created
by the application of the American treble-damage remedy to foreign
citizens.240 Moreover, the United States would undoubtedly object
and refuse to cooperate with foreign prosecutions if foreign states use
violations of the agreement to justify extreme penal sanctions. A
general provision on appropriate remedies would greatly facilitate
international cooperation for national investigations undertaken
consistent with the norms of the Agreed Principles and Rules. The
lack of such a provision suggests that functional international coop-
eration may not yet be feasible.
2. Little or No Progress in Interstate Information Exchange
In addition to recommending national promulgation of certain
standards, the Agreed Principles and Rules asks states to undertake
minimal efforts aimed at information gathering and exchange.
These provisions, however, constitute one of the disappointments of
the UNCRBP negotiations. Section E(6) calls on states to "institute
or improve procedures for obtaining information from enterprises
• ..necessary for their effective control of restrictive business prac-
tices, including in this respect details of restrictive agreements,
understandings and other arrangements."'24' It is unclear whether
the provision envisions legislation requiring periodic reports from
enterprises, or whether the grant of subpoena power to national
investigative bodies is sufficient. The agreement does admonish
states to accord "legitimate business secret" protection "normally
applicable in this field, particularly to protect ... confidential-
ity."242
Section E(9) urges states to supply other states, "on request or at
their own initiative when the need comes to their attention, ...
information necessary to the receiving interested State for its effec-
tive control of restrictive business practices." 243 The provision does
not ask for special legislation, but rather applies "to the extent con-
240. The United Kingdom has recently enacted a law that provides a cause of action
in British courts for nationals to recover two-thirds of any treble-damage award suffered
in specified antitrust adjudications in the United States. See Gordon, Extraterritorial
Application of United States Economic Laws: Britain Draws the Line, 14 INT'L LAW. 151
(1980). See also note 105 supra. The American treble damage remedy has been seriously
criticized by some commentators. See, e.g., K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST
PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (1976). Some experts believe that fines
imposed on the basis of profits obtained through illegal behavior make more economic
sense than treble damages. Id at 134.
241. Agreed Principles and Rules § E(6).
242. Id § E(5).
243. Id § E(9).
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sistent with . . . laws and established public policy."' 244 Thus, the
Agreed Principles and Rules neither expands on nor otherwise
affects existing methods of international information exchange.
Rather, the document merely asks states to cooperate within the
existing international information exchange procedures.
The information exchange provisions of the Agreed Principles
and Rules, therefore, make no specific inroads on the recurring prob-
lem of foreign discovery in restrictive business practice actions. The
omission is glaring. International information exchange is one of the
central problems impeding the enforcement of existing restrictive
business practice codes, and the current system is functioning poorly.
For example, a U.S. court has the power to order the production of
foreign documents when it has or can acquire inpersonam jurisdic-
tion over the party controlling the documents.245 Several Western
countries, upset over the scope of American antitrust investigations,
have enacted or otherwise promulgated nondisclosure laws or limita-
tions on discovery.246 "Blocking statutes" are now in force in at least
twenty countries, including Australia, Canada, the Federal Republic
of Germany, the Netherlands, South Africa, France, and the United
Kingdom. 247 Countries have relied on these statutes in refusing to
comply with American grand jury subpoenas and court discovery
orders in private litigation.24 Additional problems arise when
domestic courts seek documents from recalcitrant foreign citizens
over whom they exercise no in personam jurisdiction. States must
labor under the vague obligations imposed by considerations of
international comity in resorting and responding to letters roga-
tory.249 The cumulation of these chaotic procedures substantially
244. Id
245. See, e.g., United States v. First Natl City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968); First
Nat'l City Bank v. Internal Revenue Service, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied
361 U.S. 948 (1960). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1976) (authorizing subpoenas directed at
"a national or resident of the United States who is in a foreign country"); United States
v. Lansky, 496 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally Edwards, Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 18 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 646 (1969); Note, Taking
Evidence Outside the United States, 55 B.U. L. REV. 368 (1975).
246. See generally Flexner, note 105 supra; Note, Discovery of Documents Located
Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation: Recent Developments in the Law Concerning the For-
eign illegality Excusefor Non-Production, 14 VA. J. INT'L. L. 747 (1974); Comment,
Ordering Production of Documentsfrom Abroad in Violation of Foreign Law, 31 U. CHI.
L. REV. 791 (1964).
247. See B. HAWK, supra note 203, at 319; WASHINGTON MEMORANDUM (BNA), Dec.
16, 1980, at 1.
248. Most recently, investigators in the uranium cartel litigation confronted the effects
of such a statute. The Canadian statute in question prevented U.S. authorities from
obtaining information relevant to price-fixing. The Canadian authorities regarded such
requests as infringing on their sovereign prerogatives. B. HAWK, supra note 203, at 319-
20.
249. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 35 §§ 1781-1782 (1976); Fed. R. Civ. P. 28(b).
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blocks efforts by states to obtain documents located in foreign juris-
dictions. As one practitioner has stated: "[I]t is no exaggeration to
say that the present record reflects only minimal cooperation or
coordination."2 50
Experts from both developing and developed countries recog-
nize that the success of international and national rules dealing with
transnational corporations depends on successful procedures for
interstate information exchange. 25' Typical antitrust investigations
require a detailed economic analysis of a relevant market, as well as
a careful study of voluminous corporate records. When the actors
are multinational firms, whose conduct affects the economies of sev-
eral states and whose offices are located in several states, the various
states must cooperate in order to gather the data material to an effec-
tive inquiry.
The UNCRBP negotiators were apparently unwilling to urge
states to adopt mechanisms to formalize information exchange pro-
cedures. Presumably, the negotiators were wary of committing their
states (even through voluntary provisions) to cooperate with other
states' prosecutions of restrictive business practices. Perhaps the
negotiators were concerned with the possibility that a foreign prose-
cution may be based on practices that are condoned in the state that
is asked to provide information. For example, it would be extremely
unpopular for the United States to commit itself to support prosecu-
tions in Group of 77 countries based on an enacted version of the
Letters rogatory are the medium, in effect, whereby one country, speaking
through one of its courts, requests another country, acting through its own courts
and by methods of court procedure peculiar thereto and entirely within the lat-
ter's control, to assist the administration of justice in the former country; such
request being made, and being usually granted, by reason of the comity existing
between nations in ordinary times.
The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.D. La. 1941). See generally Jones, International udi-
cial Assistance." Procedural Chaos and a Programfor Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953);
Note, supra note 245, at 372-77. The United States participated in a recent effort to
conclude a multilateral agreement on international judicial assistance-the Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1781 (1976). See also Amram, U.S. Ratqfcation of the Hague Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 104 (1973); Note, supra note 245, at 379-86. Only
six countries have ratified the Convention: Denmark, Norway, France, Portugal, Sweden
and the United States. A receiving country may not refuse to honor a request for infor-
mation except when the letter does not comply with Convention requirements, when the
execution of the letter would require the performance of acts that do not fall within the
functions of that state's judiciary, or when the execution of the letter is prejudicial to the
state's security or sovereignty. See 28 U.S.C. § 1781, arts. 5, 12 (1976). The United
States also has entered into formal cooperation agreements with Canada and the Federal
Republic of Germany. Both agreements include information exchange provisions. The
agreements have not prevented conflicts between the parties. See B. HAWK, supra note
203, at 812.
250. Plaine, supra note 139, at 25.
251. See notes 63 & 240 supra and accompanying text.
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Model Antitrust Law for Developing Countries.252 A possible solu-
tion to such a concern could have been a provision in the Agreed
Principles and Rules conditioning cooperation in a specified infor-
mation exchange mechanism on the requirement that the foreign
prosecution be based reasonably on violations of the agreement's
norms. Such a provision would not only produce benefits associated
with a formalized information exchange procedure, but would also
encourage states to respect the norms of the agreement in their
enforcement actions. Foreign states adopting an overly restrictive
code would do so at the risk of disqualifying themselves from bene-
fiting from the information exchange provisions.
3. Exemption for State-Sanctioned Conduct
A well-meaning state receives no guidance on the appropriate-
ness of granting exemptions for conduct otherwise condemned under
the standards of the UNCRBP code. Rather, the Agreed Principles
and Rules merely recognizes that nations are free to exempt conduct
with specific legislation, and asks other countries to respect the legis-
lation.
In order to ensure that fair and equitable application of the Set of Principles
and Rules, States, while bearing in mind the need to ensure the comprehen-
sive application of the Set of Principles and Rules, should take due account
of the extent to which the conduct of enterprises, whether or not created or
controlled by States, is accepted under applicable legislation or regulations,
bearing in mind that such laws and regulations should be clearly defined and
publicly and readily available, or is required by States.
253
Absent is even a general admonishment that countries refrain from
indulging in protectionist tendencies. The agreement leaves the mat-
ter wholly to the discretion of each country, and asks countries to
respect each others' legislation. Indeed, subsection C(iii)(7) seems to
endorse the efforts of developing countries to establish commodity
cartels.25 4 At minimum, the agreement might have taken the
approach of the Havana Charter,255 by asking states to refrain from
expressly sanctioning conduct that otherwise violates the norms of
the agreement unless national security issues or problems of subsis-
tence are at stake. Mere economic advantage for the acting state
would thus be an insufficient justification for such conduct.
The Agreed Principles and Rules's failure to address the propri-
ety of state-sanctioned conduct invites widespread abrogation of the
252. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
253. Agreed Principles and Rules § C(ii)(6).
254. Id § C(iii)(7). See also Davidow, supra note 5, at 58 (suggesting optimistically,
but unrealistically, that the exemption for state-sanctioned commodity cartels like OPEC
may be read to require the approval of consumer states).
255. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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agreement's standards. For example, Group D countries could effec-
tively exclude their state-owned enterprises by enacting legislation or
promulgating rules that specifically "accept" the conduct of such
enterprises. The omission is unfortunate, because no effective solu-
tion to the state sanctioning problem can be forged solely through
national action. International diplomacy demands that one sover-
eign respect the legislation of another. In the United States, for
example, the state action and sovereign immunity doctrines protect
OPEC.256 Accordingly, this problem requires international negotia-
tion and compromise. The failure of the Conference to deal seri-
ously with the issue suggests, perhaps better than any other single
event, that the participants on all sides, in the end, accepted very
limited goals for the Conference. The participants were unwilling to
tackle the paramount international restrictive business practice prob-
lem-the legitimacy of international cartels, such as OPEC, and of
national cartels, such as those permitted by the Webb-Pomerene Act
in the United States.257
CONCLUSION
The question remains whether the Agreed Principles and Rules
represents a salutary negotiating achievement. United States negoti-
ators argue that, though the code may be ambiguous, it increases the
tendency of diverse states to adopt a uniform approach to antitrust
problems, and provides a mechanism for continuing international
discussion on restrictive business practice issues. One of the mem-
bers of the U.S. delegation to UNCRBP summed up the position
well:
Experts of western and other developed nations have believed, based on their
own OECD experience, that one-time, international agreements with hard
and fast rules are not at present a feasible method of dealing with restrictive
business practices in all their contexts. Rather, it is believed that a gradual
exchange of information and experience, comparison of legislation and
enforcement, and development of common norms based on majority
approaches will, over time, serve an educational role, develop personal con-
tacts between antitrust experts in different countries, facilitate bilateral coop-
eration and consultation, and create bases for further work, particularly at
the regional level. 258
The Agreed Principles and Rules may be valuable under this
incremental approach, provided all signatory states understand and
respect the limited nature of the compact. A signatory state accord-
ing more than limited significance to the agreement, however, (a
country that believes the Agreed Principles and Rules reflects a fun-
256. See note I ll supra.
257. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
258. Davidow, supra note 34, at 603.
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damental accord) may be frustrated and disillusioned when other
states do not conform to its theories of interpretation. Such a state
may see its efforts and sacrifices not being reciprocated, and this per-
ception may reinforce the state's belief that non-conforming states
are untrustworthy. Moreover, the agreement may be misused by
opportunistic states which find that a slanted construction can serve
their political purposes. Both phenomena could exacerbate interna-
tional tensions over the role of transnational corporations. A true
assessment of the value of the Agreed Principles and Rules, there-
fore, requires balancing these incremental advantages claimed by the
U.S. negotiators against the potential mischief created by a docu-
ment purporting to embody a consensus that does not in fact exist.
On December 5, 1980, as this Article went to press, the United
Nations General Assembly, at the 83d plenary meeting of its thirty-
fifth session, adopted the "Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Prac-
tices" previously approved by the United Nations Conference on
Restrictive Business Practices. 35 U.N. GAOR (83d plen. mtg.),
Supp. (Agenda Item 61) 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/63 (1980). The
General Assembly resolution specifically requested the Trade and
Development Board of UNCTAD to establish an intergovernmental
group of experts as recommended in section 6 of the Agreed Princi-
ples and Rules.
Two aspects of the General Assembly resolution deserve special
notice. First, the Agreed Principles and Rules was passed without
recorded objections. The General Assembly, therefore, mirrored the
unanimity of the UNCRBP. The size of the consensus will augment
significantly the resolution's influence. See notes 10-15 supra and
accompanying text. Second, the General Assembly resolution made
specific reference in its Preamble to the basic documents of the New
International Economic Order. See note 43 supra. The Preamble
notes that the agreement is in furtherance of the New International
Economic Order program. The language thus suggests that the argu-
ments of Group of 77 countries for discriminatory treatment of their
indigenous industries, in accord with New International Economic
Order principles, will reappear in arguments on the meaning of lan-
guage in the agreement. See notes 233-39 supra and accompanying
text.
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